Why does God Exist?

Introduction

The Cosmological argument for God's existence looks at the universe and asks what the cause of it is. Proponents of the argument also maintain that God's existence need not have a cause. Atheists have long replied that theists can't have it both ways. If theists are willing to posit God without any explanation, why are atheists not so obliged to posit the universe without any explanation?

Historically, theists have attempted to circumvent explaining the existence of God (but still positing a cause for the universe) in three ways: (1) God has existed for eternity, (2) God is logically necessary, or (3) God contains the reason for his own existence.

I attempt to show that all three ways fail to satisfactorily answer the question. I will give a fourth response that does salvage the Cosmological argument and admits that (1) God's existence is a brute fact but yet (2) the universe should be explained using God's existence.

Analysis

Key Assumption

In the following analysis, I will use the following proposition to establish my criticism of the three different responses.

P: One can imagine God as not existing. That being either that there is no God, there is nothing at all, or there is a very powerful being who could have varying degrees of knowledge and goodness.

Surely, P is true. We could imagine there being a God who is pretty good, but not morally perfect. We could imagine there being a very powerful evil being instead of an all-good God. We could even imagine there being nothing. This shows that God's existence need not occur.

Response 1: God's existence had no beginning.

When attempting to explain why we need not explain God's existence but we do need to explain the universe's existence, some theists have mentioned that God has existed for eternity. The universe, on the other hand, hasn't always existed so this begs for an explanation whereas God's existence does not.

This response relies on the following assumption (denoted A1):

A1. Something has a cause for its existence if and only if it had a beginning.

Perhaps it can be established that if something had a beginning, then it has a cause. However, this doesn't imply that if something doesn't have a beginning, it cannot have a cause.

Let's bring up proposition P from before. Surely, even if God has existed for all eternity, he may have had different properties. God could have existed for all eternity and been less than morally perfect. God need not have all knowledge to have existed for all eternity and it is the case that he could have not existed at all, for all eternity. Therefore, mentioning that God had no beginning fails to explain why God has the properties he has or why he exists in the first place.

To put it a different way, this argument supposes that the existence of God at a given time can be fully explained by looking at a time before when he existed. However, this does not explain why God exists in the first place with the properties he has.

So, the first response fails to establish that we need to explain the existence of the universe but yet God's existence can go unexplained.

Response 2: God is logically necessary

Another way to circumvent the issue is to argue that God's existence is logically necessary via the Ontological argument. Basically, this argument attempts to show that God's non-existence is logically impossible. Much like the statement that 2+2=4. This statement has to be true, regardless of anything else. The argument attempts to establish God's existence being akin to the existence of mathematical theorems or logical rules.

To throw some doubt onto any form of the ontological argument, one must note that most philosophers do not accept it as sound. Also, we can recall proposition P. If P is true, then God's existence need not hold which implies that God's existence is not logically necessary. It is curious that one is able to imagine God as not existing or to exist in a different way if the ontological argument is supposed to be successful.

So, the statement that God is logically necessary is not a good response since it relies on a rejection of proposition P and relies on the Ontological argument. Since P is intuitively true and the Ontological argument is widely criticized, the retreat that God is logically necessary is not a successful one.

Response 3: The Principle of Sufficient Reason

Leibniz, in positing his version of the Cosmological argument, relied on the principle of sufficient reason. The principle states:

For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation why x exists.

This can be read as denying the existence of any brute facts. He argues that God contains his own reason for existing while the universe does not. Therefore, according to the principle of sufficient reason, the universe still needs a reason for its existence but God does not.

The problem here is by saying that God contains the reason for his own existence. Unless one is also relying on God being logically necessary (see response 2) the argument will fail. Of course, one can use statement P cited in the beginning to show that God could have possibly not existed so by the principle, God must need a reason to exist.

Response 4: Swinburne Salvages the Argument

With these 3 responses failing, many have concluded the Cosmological argument cannot be salvaged. However, Richard Swinburne has come up with a way to do so. In his book The Existence of God, Swinburne argues that one should move beyond a given explanation only if doing so results in a gain in explanatory power and simplicity.

One example is the law of gravity. One can note that objects fall to the ground when they are released. Why does this happen? One can posit the law of gravity as an explanation. Why is this a good explanation and why is it warranted to move beyond accepting objects falling to the ground as a brute fact?

Using Swinburne's point, in doing so, one gains simplicity and explanatory power. Surely, with the law of gravity, one can explain why objects will fall when released. Also, one gains simplicity because positing the simple law of gravity explains all the instances of objects falling to the earth. One need not accept all these separate instances as brute facts (a very complex hypothesis) but can instead posit one simple law to explain all the observations.

As a sidenote, it is interesting to note two objections often heard against positing God as an explanation for the universe are rebutted.

One being,

"If you say God created the universe, then what created him? Without saying what created God, you can't explain the universe by positing him."

This is obviously false since one can explain objects falling to the ground with the law of gravity without having to explain why the law of gravity exists.

The next being,

"When you posit a God, you have complicated the explanation. When choosing between only the universe existing and the universe and God existing, the simpler explanation is just the universe. So, Occam's Razor should be used to cut God out of the picture."

However, this objection could also be brought against the gravity explanation.

One could say, "In positing gravity, you need to posit all the instances of objects falling to the earth and the additional statement that the law of gravity makes them do so. I'll use Occam's razor and stick to the simpler picture that these objects just fall to the earth with no law to govern them."

However, since the law of gravity is being used to explain objects falling to the earth, one need not posit both in an explanation. Since the law of gravity is simpler than supposing all the separate instances when objects have fallen to the ground, gravity can be used to explain the instances in question.

Likewise, since God is being posited to explain the universe, one need not posit both entities, just God. If God is simpler than the universe, then positing God is the simpler hypothesis.

So, Swinburne's principle states that if you gain simplicity and explanatory power by positing a new entity, then that increases the probability the entity exists. However, why think that God is simpler than the universe? Also, how can God be used to explain the universe's existence? What reasons does God have for that?

Swinburne argues that positing God is positing an entity with only one property. That being omnipotence. He uses this property to argue that God must also be omniscient, perfectly free, and morally perfect. Since God is a being with one property, he is clearly simpler than the universe we observe.

Also, God has good reasons to create a universe like the one we observe. Clearly, creating humans is a good thing. It is good for beings to exist who have the choice between good and evil and can affect the world around them, for better or worse. (See Chapter 6 of The Existence of God.)

Clearly, God has the ability to create a complex universe since he is omnipotent. Therefore, positing the existence of God gives us reason to expect a universe with humans.

It has been established that God is a simpler hypothesis than the complex universe and can be used to explain the existence of that universe. Therefore, the observation of a complex universe increases the probability of the existence of God.

But why does God exist? Why can we stop at God and not stop at the universe? Well, using the same principle, if we posited a cause for God, we would not gain simplicity since God is already an exceedingly simple being. So, it is not unlikely God would exist uncaused. However, the universe, given its complexity, is very unlikely to exist uncaused.

Swinburne concludes chapter 7 on the Cosmological argument in this way:

There is quite a chance that, if there is a God, he will make something of the finitude and complexity of a universe. It is very unlikely that a universe would exist uncaused, but rather more likely that God would exist uncaused. (p. 152)

Using Swinburne's principle, we have salvaged the Cosmological argument.

Conclusion

Critics of the Cosmological argument have long objected that you can't ask for a cause of the universe while also ignoring that God is being posited without an explanation. Three responses to this charge have traditionally been given but they all fail. They are (1) God has a beginning but the universe does not, (2) God is logically necessary but the universe is not, and (3) God has sufficient reason to exist but the universe does not.

A more sophisticated response from Swinburne states that God is simpler than the universe and one gains explanatory power by positing God, so the probability God exists is increased. This response allows God to exist uncaused rather than allowing the universe to exist uncaused. This is because of the simplicity of God compared to the complexity of the universe. Since God is far simpler, it is far more likely he would exist uncaused rather than the universe.


(For Swinburne's discussion of these points, see Chapters 5-7 of The Existence of God.)