The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is made up of 2500 scientists from around the world who work to look at the evidence of global warming and assess its impact on the world. They just put out a new report and its is very frightening. Here is some things they say:
"The IPCC concludes that global warming has almost certainly triggered changes in the Earth's ecosystem that have already been felt in increased drought, shrinking glaciers and changing seasons, and these effects are expected to intensify. Freshwater stored in glaciers and snow cover will be lost, while rainfall will increasingly come in destructive deluges, reducing the water supply to one-sixth of the humanity — with the teeming masses dependent on the melt water from the Himalayas particularly hard hit. Some 20-30% of plant and animal species are at risk of extinction if global temperatures rise in line with median projections, while by 2080, many millions of people living along coastlines will face an annual flood risk.
The IPCC expects climate change to bring "increased deaths, disease and injury due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts," with most of the pain being borne by the poor, tropical countries already on the edge of environmental disaster. In Africa by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are expected to suffer from increased water shortages resulting from climate change, and attempting to adapt could consume as much as 10% of the GDP of African nations. In poorly nourished Central and South Asia, crop yields could decrease 30% by 2050. "The poorest of the poor are going to be the worst hit," said IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri. "People who are poor are least able to adapt to climate change."
The IPCC has also concluded that it human activity is most likely the "chief driver" of global warming. However, these things can fail to occur if we act now to prevent it. Now is a crucial time. So, what do the politicians of China, US, and Russia do about it?
"The IPCC had concluded in February that greenhouse gas emissions from human activity were "very likely" the chief driver of global warming, and Friday's report dealt with its human and ecological impact. But clashes between scientists and political officials over its wording almost prevented the report from being published on schedule. Countries such as China, Russia and the U.S. reportedly pushed to water down the IPCC's predictions, while the scientists whose work formed the backbone of the report fought back in an all-night session preceding Friday's release."
From the Time article here.
Monday, April 23, 2007
A Perspective on the Pledge by Alonzo Fyfe
An interesting parody of the people who often argue "the pledge of allegiance says 'one nation under God' in it to reflect our heritage. Therefore, it should stay there."
From here.
From here.
"Okay," said Shawn. "Then, 50 years ago, Congress added the word white to the Pledge of Allegiance. We are supposed to be one white nation, indivisible. When we pledge allegiance to one white nation, doesn't this mean that not being white is as bad as being in favor of rebellion or tyranny or injustice?"
"No," Shelby said with a sigh of relief. "No, not at all. Congress added that to reflect our heritage. It simply pays respect to the fact that all of our founding fathers were white, and that they clearly wanted to establish a white nation, and the fact that all of our past Presidents have been white."
16 Questions for Atheists
My friend James Lazarus has posted his answers to 16 questions for atheists originally posted by some Christians. Here is a link to his response to the 16 questions. I will provide my own.
1. Why is there something rather than nothing?
This question is ambiguous. First, it may mean, "Why does anything exist at all?" If it means that, then I think the theist and nontheist alike is plagued by the same question. Why does God exist rather than not? Some theists have argued God is a logically necessary being via the Ontological Argument. In that argument, it is attempted to show that God must exist due to logical necessity. However, I don't think the Ontological Argument works since it is possible to imagine a universe without a God existing. Therefore, I don't think it can be shown that God is logically necessary in the same way that "2 + 2 =4" is. Given this, theists also have to wrestle with the question of why there is a God rather than not.
The statement may also mean, "Why does the universe exist?" The theists will answer that the universe exists because God created it. The nontheist cannot use a similar answer of course. However, why think there needs to be an answer? One can just ask the theist where God came from and given the failure of the Ontological argument above, they wouldn't have an answer. God's existence would go unexplained. Either side has to posit a brute, unexplained fact. The theist posits God and the atheist posits the universe. Why prefer one over the other?
One can decide between the two in terms of simplicity and explanatory power. If it can be shown that God is the simpler hypothesis and has more explanatory power than the brute fact of the universe, then God would be shown to exist. This needs to be shown first before asking this question, however.
2. How do you know that you exist (without being circular)?
I'm not all that sure what relevance this has to theism. I don't think we can have an answer to this that isn't circular. I take it as a basic belief without evidence that I exist. I think it is also possible to "know" some things that are basic. I'm not exactly sure how this works though since usually, knowledge is in need of justification and basic beliefs are by definition not based on any other beliefs.
3. Where does human self-consciousness come from?
I don't know. I haven't researched the subject much. I'd say the current research on the brain can explain a lot about ourselves but I'm not sure it can explain it all. I also think atheism is consistent with mind-body dualism though I don't know how one would explain where the mind came from.
4. How do you know your senses are reliable (without being circular)?
I don't think one can answer this in a non-circular fashion. A theist would say that her senses are reliable because God made them and He would make them reliable. However, one can then ask how one knows God is concerned with truth or how one knows God is morally perfect? One must then appeal to their "sense" of truth or some type of argument which, even if not evidential, will have to rely on some type of reasoning which would be carried out by the person's mind. One can then ask why they rely on their reasoning faculty.
The atheist is in the same boat. We have a better chance of survival if we have true beliefs and reliable methods of obtaining those beliefs. Evolution then would be likely to give us some reliable faculties which we can use. We can then improve on these faculties throughout our lives through training and make them even more reliable. This is why I trust my senses and in general, my reasoning abilities. If this is circular, then so is any theist response.
5. What is truth?
A proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. It is false if it doesn't.
6. What is the cause of everything?
Well, I take this to mean, "What is the cause of the universe?" and my answer would be similar to the answer to #1.
7. What is the purpose of mankind?
Well, an atheist wouldn't believe mankind has any divine purpose. However, that doesn't mean there is no right or wrong thing to do. What is right or wrong need not be defined in terms of how our creator planned us to live. In fact, it only could be if the creator was good. If the creator were evil and gave us the purpose of causing as much suffering as possible, that wouldn't make us obliged to follow it. At that point, we would be obligated to go against our given purpose. So, even if there is no purpose of mankind, that doesn't mean there is no morality.
8. How do we determine right from wrong? Is there such a standard? Where does it come from? The State? DNA?
Some people look at their religious text to determine right from wrong. If these religious texts are false, then that is not a reliable standard. In determining if the standard is reliable, one must make sure that in relying on the standard, one isn't positing imaginary entities that don't exist in the real world. If one's standard relies on a nonexistent God, then it is not a good standard. If one's standard relies on the claim that "Whatever my state says is morally correct" or if it says "Whatever my DNA has programmed me to believe about morality" is morally correct, then these are not good standards.
I'd say that a reliable standard is a consequentialist one. Not in the sense of, judge the act by its consequences, but to judge a desire by its consequences. For the long, extended explanation, see Alonzo Fyfe here.
9. What is the difference, from an atheistic standpoint, between love and hate? Aren't these merely emotional responses triggered by certain stimuli? Why is one better than the other?
These are emotional responses triggered by stimuli but that doesn't remove the possibility of people being morally responsible for them. These emotional responses are produced by our beliefs and desires. How someone reacts to say someone calling them a bad name reflects their character. Different people with different characters will react differently. Therefore, one can blame someone for their reactions to stimuli.
Love is better than the other because it is conducive to desire fulfillment whereas hate is generally not. Hate is by definition desire-thwarting so this makes it a desire we shouldn't promote in others, that is if we are concerned for our own well-being and that of others. So, love is better than hate for this reason.
10. How do you explain transcendent truth? i.e. Even folks that have never heard of the Bible (like tribe people in deep jungles) knowing that stealing, murder, adultery, etc. is wrong?
I think this one is fairly easy. I would take out murder since murder is immoral by definition. It's like asking, "How did you know the blue ball was blue?" Well, it's a blue ball so it must be blue, duh!
As for the rest, I would say that figuring out that the desire to steal is not conducive to desire fulfillment overall is pretty obvious. I don't think we need complex scientific theories to see this is true. The same can be said of committing adultery and the general act of being dishonest. Surely, society functions much better when people have a desire to tell people the truth and to not steal from others.
11. Isn't implicit, weak or negative atheism (ala George Smith, David Eller & Michael Martin) just another form of agnosticism? If the atheist critiques theism without justification, then isn't he/she believing in atheism with something other than rational thought? And as soon as the atheist provides any kind of rational justification for his/her critique of theism, hasn't he/she just moved into explicit, strong or positive atheism? And if so, doesn't he/she then need to worry about some burden of proof for his/her belief in a lack of belief?
One could define lack of belief in a God as a form of agnosticism. Definitions don't matter much to me. See my earlier post. I don't know what it means to "critique theism without justification" so I can't answer the second question. I think critiquing theism would be equivalent to giving evidence for positive atheism only if "atheism" is defined as the "disbelief in the God being critiqued." I don't think one can argue from "God as you define it has problems, therefore all definitions of 'god' will have problems." I don't understand the last question since positive atheism is a disbelief, not just a lack of belief.
12. If you honestly do not believe there is a God, why do you ask so many questions about a God you don't believe exists?
I'd say there's many reasons. The first is that religious people use their religious text to justify harm done to others. At this point, it is important to research whether using the given religious text is the right thing to do. Is it reliable? Are the other claims it makes true? To answer these questions, one needs to know certain things about the ancient world, God, and so on. A second reason is that so many people believe in some form of a god that atheists want to know why. A third reason is that if there is a God in the traditional sense, then it would be very important morally. To find out that a morally perfect being created you and gave you the gift of life, that would make it super-wrong to do wrong acts. Also, since we owe a being who created us something, we would owe God obedience (to a certain extent). Of course, there is a limit to how much God can ask of us much the same way there is a limit to how much anyone can ask of us when a favor is done. See my answer to #7 above. If our creator asked us to rape as much as possible, then even though we owe our creator certain things, we don't owe it to him to obey that command. So, I think God's existence would have some bearing on morality and he would be a source of morality. See my earlier post.
13. If you really don't believe God exists what does it matter to you, how He should choose to punish those who don't believe?
I think it matters because people often use their belief in this matter to justify harming others. Some people who believe that homosexuals go to hell use this fact to justify beating them up and calling them names. They justify these things by saying that if it'll help even one person change their ways, it was worth it since hell is such a bad place.
I don't think belief is a morally cupable action that one can be blamed for. So, a morally good person wouldn't punish someone just for their belief. He would only punish people insofar as their beliefs indicate the presence of bad desires. I think it is important for wrongdoers to atone for their wrongdoing. It is important to "make it up" to the person you wronged. I don't think there is any good reason why God would draw the line at death as the last chance to atone for our sins. I think good people who don't end up atoning for their sins before they die should go to a limbo-type place where they can find out the truth and see if they want to atone for their sins. If they don't want to, I think they should either be allowed to continue to exist in a place other than limbo or heaven or possibly if they no longer want to exist, then God would terminate their existence.
14. If you really believe God doesn't exist, then there is no worry of punishment for you anyway, so why get upset just because someone else believes you're going to a place they believe exists?
I don't get upset because someone has different beliefs about the afterlife than me. I may want to show their view to be false or indefensible, but I don't get upset about their view. And the reason why atheists tend to get upset is because the religious people, believing atheists will go to hell and never return, try many immoral things to get atheists to become of their religion. That is something to be upset about.
15. How about "life from no life?"
I don't really see what the trouble is in believing this. I don't think life is so fundamentally different from non-living things that perhaps non-living things would eventually bring about life. People who are alive are made up of the same elements as the things that aren't alive. Diamond is a form of carbon. I think one needs to give a good explanation of how life came about, yes but I don't think the fact that scientists don't have one means we should automatically jump to "God did it." Theists have made this mistake in the past and have been wrong, things like "God makes the planets revolve around the sun."
Most biologists agree that it's possible and I don't see any reason to think they are wrong. It's just an area where science hasn't given us a definite answer yet, but that doesn't mean there isn't one forthcoming. However, there are many plausible stories, none of which has any definite evidence over the other, but they are still plausible nonetheless.
16. How can atheists speak definitively, authoritatively, or otherwise on the metaphysical (and spiritual)which is beyond their experience?
Many theists don't have the relevant experience they would need to say other religions are false. They never studied the Kabballah, Hindu religious texts, or the Koran. They never went to other churches and prayed to their god(s) and worshipped them in the way the leaders told them to worship. So, how can they say the other religions are false?
I think reason can play a part here. If they have some argument or some type of personal experience, they may reason from that to say that other religions are false. The same can be said of atheists though they don't necessarily have a personal experience, they just have arguments. But surely, one is only better than the other because one is more certain than the other. It's not that one needs to have both to be justified in their take on religion.
For example, if someone believed in leprachauns, you would be justified in not giving their claim very much weight. If they responded with, "Well you're no expert on leprachuan-searching, how would you know they don't exist?" one can easily see the absurdity of asking the question. So, one can respond to metaphysical questions which is beyond their experience if they think the object is impossible or improbable to exist. The same goes for everyone.
1. Why is there something rather than nothing?
This question is ambiguous. First, it may mean, "Why does anything exist at all?" If it means that, then I think the theist and nontheist alike is plagued by the same question. Why does God exist rather than not? Some theists have argued God is a logically necessary being via the Ontological Argument. In that argument, it is attempted to show that God must exist due to logical necessity. However, I don't think the Ontological Argument works since it is possible to imagine a universe without a God existing. Therefore, I don't think it can be shown that God is logically necessary in the same way that "2 + 2 =4" is. Given this, theists also have to wrestle with the question of why there is a God rather than not.
The statement may also mean, "Why does the universe exist?" The theists will answer that the universe exists because God created it. The nontheist cannot use a similar answer of course. However, why think there needs to be an answer? One can just ask the theist where God came from and given the failure of the Ontological argument above, they wouldn't have an answer. God's existence would go unexplained. Either side has to posit a brute, unexplained fact. The theist posits God and the atheist posits the universe. Why prefer one over the other?
One can decide between the two in terms of simplicity and explanatory power. If it can be shown that God is the simpler hypothesis and has more explanatory power than the brute fact of the universe, then God would be shown to exist. This needs to be shown first before asking this question, however.
2. How do you know that you exist (without being circular)?
I'm not all that sure what relevance this has to theism. I don't think we can have an answer to this that isn't circular. I take it as a basic belief without evidence that I exist. I think it is also possible to "know" some things that are basic. I'm not exactly sure how this works though since usually, knowledge is in need of justification and basic beliefs are by definition not based on any other beliefs.
3. Where does human self-consciousness come from?
I don't know. I haven't researched the subject much. I'd say the current research on the brain can explain a lot about ourselves but I'm not sure it can explain it all. I also think atheism is consistent with mind-body dualism though I don't know how one would explain where the mind came from.
4. How do you know your senses are reliable (without being circular)?
I don't think one can answer this in a non-circular fashion. A theist would say that her senses are reliable because God made them and He would make them reliable. However, one can then ask how one knows God is concerned with truth or how one knows God is morally perfect? One must then appeal to their "sense" of truth or some type of argument which, even if not evidential, will have to rely on some type of reasoning which would be carried out by the person's mind. One can then ask why they rely on their reasoning faculty.
The atheist is in the same boat. We have a better chance of survival if we have true beliefs and reliable methods of obtaining those beliefs. Evolution then would be likely to give us some reliable faculties which we can use. We can then improve on these faculties throughout our lives through training and make them even more reliable. This is why I trust my senses and in general, my reasoning abilities. If this is circular, then so is any theist response.
5. What is truth?
A proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. It is false if it doesn't.
6. What is the cause of everything?
Well, I take this to mean, "What is the cause of the universe?" and my answer would be similar to the answer to #1.
7. What is the purpose of mankind?
Well, an atheist wouldn't believe mankind has any divine purpose. However, that doesn't mean there is no right or wrong thing to do. What is right or wrong need not be defined in terms of how our creator planned us to live. In fact, it only could be if the creator was good. If the creator were evil and gave us the purpose of causing as much suffering as possible, that wouldn't make us obliged to follow it. At that point, we would be obligated to go against our given purpose. So, even if there is no purpose of mankind, that doesn't mean there is no morality.
8. How do we determine right from wrong? Is there such a standard? Where does it come from? The State? DNA?
Some people look at their religious text to determine right from wrong. If these religious texts are false, then that is not a reliable standard. In determining if the standard is reliable, one must make sure that in relying on the standard, one isn't positing imaginary entities that don't exist in the real world. If one's standard relies on a nonexistent God, then it is not a good standard. If one's standard relies on the claim that "Whatever my state says is morally correct" or if it says "Whatever my DNA has programmed me to believe about morality" is morally correct, then these are not good standards.
I'd say that a reliable standard is a consequentialist one. Not in the sense of, judge the act by its consequences, but to judge a desire by its consequences. For the long, extended explanation, see Alonzo Fyfe here.
9. What is the difference, from an atheistic standpoint, between love and hate? Aren't these merely emotional responses triggered by certain stimuli? Why is one better than the other?
These are emotional responses triggered by stimuli but that doesn't remove the possibility of people being morally responsible for them. These emotional responses are produced by our beliefs and desires. How someone reacts to say someone calling them a bad name reflects their character. Different people with different characters will react differently. Therefore, one can blame someone for their reactions to stimuli.
Love is better than the other because it is conducive to desire fulfillment whereas hate is generally not. Hate is by definition desire-thwarting so this makes it a desire we shouldn't promote in others, that is if we are concerned for our own well-being and that of others. So, love is better than hate for this reason.
10. How do you explain transcendent truth? i.e. Even folks that have never heard of the Bible (like tribe people in deep jungles) knowing that stealing, murder, adultery, etc. is wrong?
I think this one is fairly easy. I would take out murder since murder is immoral by definition. It's like asking, "How did you know the blue ball was blue?" Well, it's a blue ball so it must be blue, duh!
As for the rest, I would say that figuring out that the desire to steal is not conducive to desire fulfillment overall is pretty obvious. I don't think we need complex scientific theories to see this is true. The same can be said of committing adultery and the general act of being dishonest. Surely, society functions much better when people have a desire to tell people the truth and to not steal from others.
11. Isn't implicit, weak or negative atheism (ala George Smith, David Eller & Michael Martin) just another form of agnosticism? If the atheist critiques theism without justification, then isn't he/she believing in atheism with something other than rational thought? And as soon as the atheist provides any kind of rational justification for his/her critique of theism, hasn't he/she just moved into explicit, strong or positive atheism? And if so, doesn't he/she then need to worry about some burden of proof for his/her belief in a lack of belief?
One could define lack of belief in a God as a form of agnosticism. Definitions don't matter much to me. See my earlier post. I don't know what it means to "critique theism without justification" so I can't answer the second question. I think critiquing theism would be equivalent to giving evidence for positive atheism only if "atheism" is defined as the "disbelief in the God being critiqued." I don't think one can argue from "God as you define it has problems, therefore all definitions of 'god' will have problems." I don't understand the last question since positive atheism is a disbelief, not just a lack of belief.
12. If you honestly do not believe there is a God, why do you ask so many questions about a God you don't believe exists?
I'd say there's many reasons. The first is that religious people use their religious text to justify harm done to others. At this point, it is important to research whether using the given religious text is the right thing to do. Is it reliable? Are the other claims it makes true? To answer these questions, one needs to know certain things about the ancient world, God, and so on. A second reason is that so many people believe in some form of a god that atheists want to know why. A third reason is that if there is a God in the traditional sense, then it would be very important morally. To find out that a morally perfect being created you and gave you the gift of life, that would make it super-wrong to do wrong acts. Also, since we owe a being who created us something, we would owe God obedience (to a certain extent). Of course, there is a limit to how much God can ask of us much the same way there is a limit to how much anyone can ask of us when a favor is done. See my answer to #7 above. If our creator asked us to rape as much as possible, then even though we owe our creator certain things, we don't owe it to him to obey that command. So, I think God's existence would have some bearing on morality and he would be a source of morality. See my earlier post.
13. If you really don't believe God exists what does it matter to you, how He should choose to punish those who don't believe?
I think it matters because people often use their belief in this matter to justify harming others. Some people who believe that homosexuals go to hell use this fact to justify beating them up and calling them names. They justify these things by saying that if it'll help even one person change their ways, it was worth it since hell is such a bad place.
I don't think belief is a morally cupable action that one can be blamed for. So, a morally good person wouldn't punish someone just for their belief. He would only punish people insofar as their beliefs indicate the presence of bad desires. I think it is important for wrongdoers to atone for their wrongdoing. It is important to "make it up" to the person you wronged. I don't think there is any good reason why God would draw the line at death as the last chance to atone for our sins. I think good people who don't end up atoning for their sins before they die should go to a limbo-type place where they can find out the truth and see if they want to atone for their sins. If they don't want to, I think they should either be allowed to continue to exist in a place other than limbo or heaven or possibly if they no longer want to exist, then God would terminate their existence.
14. If you really believe God doesn't exist, then there is no worry of punishment for you anyway, so why get upset just because someone else believes you're going to a place they believe exists?
I don't get upset because someone has different beliefs about the afterlife than me. I may want to show their view to be false or indefensible, but I don't get upset about their view. And the reason why atheists tend to get upset is because the religious people, believing atheists will go to hell and never return, try many immoral things to get atheists to become of their religion. That is something to be upset about.
15. How about "life from no life?"
I don't really see what the trouble is in believing this. I don't think life is so fundamentally different from non-living things that perhaps non-living things would eventually bring about life. People who are alive are made up of the same elements as the things that aren't alive. Diamond is a form of carbon. I think one needs to give a good explanation of how life came about, yes but I don't think the fact that scientists don't have one means we should automatically jump to "God did it." Theists have made this mistake in the past and have been wrong, things like "God makes the planets revolve around the sun."
Most biologists agree that it's possible and I don't see any reason to think they are wrong. It's just an area where science hasn't given us a definite answer yet, but that doesn't mean there isn't one forthcoming. However, there are many plausible stories, none of which has any definite evidence over the other, but they are still plausible nonetheless.
16. How can atheists speak definitively, authoritatively, or otherwise on the metaphysical (and spiritual)which is beyond their experience?
Many theists don't have the relevant experience they would need to say other religions are false. They never studied the Kabballah, Hindu religious texts, or the Koran. They never went to other churches and prayed to their god(s) and worshipped them in the way the leaders told them to worship. So, how can they say the other religions are false?
I think reason can play a part here. If they have some argument or some type of personal experience, they may reason from that to say that other religions are false. The same can be said of atheists though they don't necessarily have a personal experience, they just have arguments. But surely, one is only better than the other because one is more certain than the other. It's not that one needs to have both to be justified in their take on religion.
For example, if someone believed in leprachauns, you would be justified in not giving their claim very much weight. If they responded with, "Well you're no expert on leprachuan-searching, how would you know they don't exist?" one can easily see the absurdity of asking the question. So, one can respond to metaphysical questions which is beyond their experience if they think the object is impossible or improbable to exist. The same goes for everyone.
Friday, March 30, 2007
Using heaven to argue for hell
Against the idea that hell is eternal, people often argue that it is unjust to punish someone for an infinite amount of time for a finite number of sins. This is because each sin is only finitely wrong and hence only deserves a finite amount of punishment. Since one can only commit a finite number of sins, there is only a finite amount of wrong they can commit. Hence, they would only deserve a finite amount of suffering, not an infinite amount. So, punishing someone in hell for an infinite amount of time is wrong.
Sometimes to counter this, Christians argue that the argument can go against sending people to heaven for eternity as well. Each person who goes to heaven only commits a finite number of good acts in their life and hence is only entitled to a finite amount of reward. Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust. Therefore, it would be unjust for God to send people to heaven for all eternity.
However, since it is not unjust for God to send people to heaven, then the argument has been reduced to absurdity so it must be unsound.
This doesn't work however, because there is a necessary disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve. If we give people good things, even give them good things that they don't deserve, it is not wrong to do so. It actually may be supererogatory in some circumstances. For example, when you give money to the poor, perhaps the poor don't "deserve" your money. However, that doesn't show that it's wrong or unjust to give to the poor. It is still a good thing to do.
However, it is wrong and unjust to punish someone more than they deserve. If I deserve n days of punishment, punishing me for n+1 days would be wrong. The same with any more amount of punishment than what I deserve. So, the argument can't be reduced to absurdity because the statement " Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust" is false. There is a disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve.
Sometimes to counter this, Christians argue that the argument can go against sending people to heaven for eternity as well. Each person who goes to heaven only commits a finite number of good acts in their life and hence is only entitled to a finite amount of reward. Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust. Therefore, it would be unjust for God to send people to heaven for all eternity.
However, since it is not unjust for God to send people to heaven, then the argument has been reduced to absurdity so it must be unsound.
This doesn't work however, because there is a necessary disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve. If we give people good things, even give them good things that they don't deserve, it is not wrong to do so. It actually may be supererogatory in some circumstances. For example, when you give money to the poor, perhaps the poor don't "deserve" your money. However, that doesn't show that it's wrong or unjust to give to the poor. It is still a good thing to do.
However, it is wrong and unjust to punish someone more than they deserve. If I deserve n days of punishment, punishing me for n+1 days would be wrong. The same with any more amount of punishment than what I deserve. So, the argument can't be reduced to absurdity because the statement " Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust" is false. There is a disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve.
Limited Omniscience is compatible with moral perfection
I have a correction to make after reading Richard Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil (specifically p. 231-232). An argument that I thought was sound is actually not a good one. As has been explained before, Swinburne believes that God doesn't know the future with absolute certainty. He may know what is probable, but he isn't absolutely sure that it will happen. Michael Martin in his book, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification brings up an objection to this. I summarize his argument on my page:
"Limited Omniscience vs. Moral Perfection
If God doesn't know the future, then he can't know whether or not his past actions were morally correct. Whether or not an action is morally correct depends on, in part, what the consequences are. However, God cannot know the consequences of his actions, therefore He can't know that He is morally perfect. God could still choose all the correct actions. However, this would have no relation to his knowledge. He would do the right thing purely on accident. Because no being can be morally perfect on accident, it follows that a being with "limited omniscience" cannot be morally perfect. Since God is supposed to be such a being, it follows that God cannot exist. [2]"
As Swinburne explains however, this objection has a false premise. What makes an action morally correct is, in part, the probable consequences of the act. The actual consequences only matter insofar as they are probable. Someone can't be blamed for what happens if they have no indication whatsoever that it will happen. Since God will know how probable all outcomes are, he can do the act that maximizes the expected value. The act that he does will be the right one.
So, since someone can't be blamed for the actual consequences of an act if there is no indication that those consequences will happen, then what makes an act right or wrong is the probable consequences. Therefore, the argument has a false premise. So, Martin's argument is unsound even though I once thought it worked. I will change it on my site and explain why the argument doesn't work.
It is important to note that this response to the argument only works if we suppose it is impossible for a being to know more than God does about the world. For example, God doesn't know the future on Swinburne's understanding. We also have to give a reason why God cannot know the future in order for this response to stick. Otherwise, one could say that a morally perfect being must know the future which would be a possible thing to know. If one shows that knowing the future is impossible if humans have libertarian free will, then the concept of moral perfection must not require a being to be morally perfect in order to fulfill it; otherwise moral perfection would be necessarily nonexistent.
So, if one defines "moral perfection" in a way that is possible for a being to fulfill it, then one must not need the requirement that the being who is morally perfect knows the future with absolute certainty. If one needs this requirement, then their definition of moral perfection is inapplicable to any possible being. This doesn't show a problem with the idea of God being morally perfect in any sense, just a problem with the sense of moral perfection that the arguer is using. If one defines a concept in a self-contradictory way, one cannot be surprised when it cannot be applied to any being at all.
And for the record, I still think the argument above it titled The Free Will Argument for the Nonexistence of God still works. However, I think it only disproves a God who can know the future. It doesn't disprove Swinburne's God who doesn't know the future with absolute certainty.
"Limited Omniscience vs. Moral Perfection
If God doesn't know the future, then he can't know whether or not his past actions were morally correct. Whether or not an action is morally correct depends on, in part, what the consequences are. However, God cannot know the consequences of his actions, therefore He can't know that He is morally perfect. God could still choose all the correct actions. However, this would have no relation to his knowledge. He would do the right thing purely on accident. Because no being can be morally perfect on accident, it follows that a being with "limited omniscience" cannot be morally perfect. Since God is supposed to be such a being, it follows that God cannot exist. [2]"
As Swinburne explains however, this objection has a false premise. What makes an action morally correct is, in part, the probable consequences of the act. The actual consequences only matter insofar as they are probable. Someone can't be blamed for what happens if they have no indication whatsoever that it will happen. Since God will know how probable all outcomes are, he can do the act that maximizes the expected value. The act that he does will be the right one.
So, since someone can't be blamed for the actual consequences of an act if there is no indication that those consequences will happen, then what makes an act right or wrong is the probable consequences. Therefore, the argument has a false premise. So, Martin's argument is unsound even though I once thought it worked. I will change it on my site and explain why the argument doesn't work.
It is important to note that this response to the argument only works if we suppose it is impossible for a being to know more than God does about the world. For example, God doesn't know the future on Swinburne's understanding. We also have to give a reason why God cannot know the future in order for this response to stick. Otherwise, one could say that a morally perfect being must know the future which would be a possible thing to know. If one shows that knowing the future is impossible if humans have libertarian free will, then the concept of moral perfection must not require a being to be morally perfect in order to fulfill it; otherwise moral perfection would be necessarily nonexistent.
So, if one defines "moral perfection" in a way that is possible for a being to fulfill it, then one must not need the requirement that the being who is morally perfect knows the future with absolute certainty. If one needs this requirement, then their definition of moral perfection is inapplicable to any possible being. This doesn't show a problem with the idea of God being morally perfect in any sense, just a problem with the sense of moral perfection that the arguer is using. If one defines a concept in a self-contradictory way, one cannot be surprised when it cannot be applied to any being at all.
And for the record, I still think the argument above it titled The Free Will Argument for the Nonexistence of God still works. However, I think it only disproves a God who can know the future. It doesn't disprove Swinburne's God who doesn't know the future with absolute certainty.
Friday, January 26, 2007
If I were a Christian (part 2)
The last post kind of ended early, I figure there's more to say about the type of Christian God I would believe in.
I wouldn't believe that God is the only source of morality. I would believe, however, that he is a source of morality. For example, if God were to say, "Okay all who follow me, I want to see you rape some young girls simply because I like rape," he would be a bad being. Him making this command wouldn't cause the act to be right. He would be evil for making the command. Hence, there are some things that even God cannot change the moral status of (like rape, adultery, etc.).
Saying all that, I would also say that there are some things God could change the moral status of. Since God created us and (presumably) caused there to be no needless suffering, died for our sins, and so on, he is a benefactor. He is actually our ultimate benefactor since our existence is due to him. If someone does you a favor, say takes out the trash every day, then you owe them something. You owe them thanks or perhaps some money if they ask for it. However, there is a limit to how much they can ask of you after they do a favor. The same goes if you wrong someone. If I wrong someone, I need to atone for what I did. This can be done by doing the person a favor, by obeying their request. Of course, like the last example, there is a limit to how much of a request they can make and still demand you to follow it. One cannot demand a million dollars, for example, simply because you stole a candy bar from their shop. So, if we were to wrong God, we would have a debt to him. This debt can be repayed by obeying him. Of course, with any person who is wronged, there is only so much they can ask and still reasonably demand it of us.
So, since God is our benefactor, and since he has been wronged by us, we are in debt to him. So, his requests have some (but not total) moral weight. These requests may be requests of worship, petitionary prayer, and attendance at church. This causes God to be a source but not the only source of morality.
In Swinburne's book, Responsibility and Atonement, he explains these concepts. He also explains how if a person's life is supposed to be a gift from God, then God cannot give very tight moral restrictions for how it is to be used (p. 129). Here's a quote where he explains this:
"No giver can give a present with full instructions on its use; I cannot 'give' you five dollars and tell you what I want you to buy for me with it. It would not then be a gift. Something is only a gift if, maybe within limits, the recipient can choose what to do with it. And a gift is not a generous one if any instructions for its use, though not totally precise, are too detailed."
So, a good God who gave us the gift of life would not subject it too very tight moral restrictions. We would have a certain amount of moral freedom where we can make our own choices.
As for the concept of original sin, I would agree with most Christians I'm sure, that we aren't to be blamed for sin coming into the world. We can't be blamed for what Adam and Eve did. I would agree that humans have a tendancy to sin and hence need atonement for their sins.
I would not agree that Jesus' death in any way "paid the price" for our sins. One person cannot be punished for the sins of another. I do believe, however, that Jesus' suffering and eventual death can be taken another way. That being that Jesus sacrificed himself so that we could see how serious our sins are. A person who is wronged (God) can sacrifice something (his Son) to show us that our sins are very serious. From Swinburne again (p. 153):
"God makes available the sacrifice (of himself), but it is we who have to offer it. Christ's laid-down life is there made available for sacrifice, like a ram caught in a thicket. Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to recognize what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly gift which another has made available to him to offer as his sacrifice...the sinner has to use Christ's death to obtain forgiveness."
He says we must identify that Jesus' life was perfect and one that we ought to have lived. We can offer Jesus' life to God as the life we should have lived. I think Swinburne's interpretation of Jesus' life and death is better than other interpretations.
I wouldn't believe that God is the only source of morality. I would believe, however, that he is a source of morality. For example, if God were to say, "Okay all who follow me, I want to see you rape some young girls simply because I like rape," he would be a bad being. Him making this command wouldn't cause the act to be right. He would be evil for making the command. Hence, there are some things that even God cannot change the moral status of (like rape, adultery, etc.).
Saying all that, I would also say that there are some things God could change the moral status of. Since God created us and (presumably) caused there to be no needless suffering, died for our sins, and so on, he is a benefactor. He is actually our ultimate benefactor since our existence is due to him. If someone does you a favor, say takes out the trash every day, then you owe them something. You owe them thanks or perhaps some money if they ask for it. However, there is a limit to how much they can ask of you after they do a favor. The same goes if you wrong someone. If I wrong someone, I need to atone for what I did. This can be done by doing the person a favor, by obeying their request. Of course, like the last example, there is a limit to how much of a request they can make and still demand you to follow it. One cannot demand a million dollars, for example, simply because you stole a candy bar from their shop. So, if we were to wrong God, we would have a debt to him. This debt can be repayed by obeying him. Of course, with any person who is wronged, there is only so much they can ask and still reasonably demand it of us.
So, since God is our benefactor, and since he has been wronged by us, we are in debt to him. So, his requests have some (but not total) moral weight. These requests may be requests of worship, petitionary prayer, and attendance at church. This causes God to be a source but not the only source of morality.
In Swinburne's book, Responsibility and Atonement, he explains these concepts. He also explains how if a person's life is supposed to be a gift from God, then God cannot give very tight moral restrictions for how it is to be used (p. 129). Here's a quote where he explains this:
"No giver can give a present with full instructions on its use; I cannot 'give' you five dollars and tell you what I want you to buy for me with it. It would not then be a gift. Something is only a gift if, maybe within limits, the recipient can choose what to do with it. And a gift is not a generous one if any instructions for its use, though not totally precise, are too detailed."
So, a good God who gave us the gift of life would not subject it too very tight moral restrictions. We would have a certain amount of moral freedom where we can make our own choices.
As for the concept of original sin, I would agree with most Christians I'm sure, that we aren't to be blamed for sin coming into the world. We can't be blamed for what Adam and Eve did. I would agree that humans have a tendancy to sin and hence need atonement for their sins.
I would not agree that Jesus' death in any way "paid the price" for our sins. One person cannot be punished for the sins of another. I do believe, however, that Jesus' suffering and eventual death can be taken another way. That being that Jesus sacrificed himself so that we could see how serious our sins are. A person who is wronged (God) can sacrifice something (his Son) to show us that our sins are very serious. From Swinburne again (p. 153):
"God makes available the sacrifice (of himself), but it is we who have to offer it. Christ's laid-down life is there made available for sacrifice, like a ram caught in a thicket. Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to recognize what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly gift which another has made available to him to offer as his sacrifice...the sinner has to use Christ's death to obtain forgiveness."
He says we must identify that Jesus' life was perfect and one that we ought to have lived. We can offer Jesus' life to God as the life we should have lived. I think Swinburne's interpretation of Jesus' life and death is better than other interpretations.
If I were a Christian (part 1)
On the bus ride home yesterday, I was reading Richard Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil. This got me thinking, if I became a Christian, what type of Christian would I be?
First, I would generally agree with Swinburne's view of the Christian God. He believes that God is all-knowing but doesn't know the future with absolute certainty. The reason why he holds this view is that he believes no being can have an incorrigible belief about what a free being will do in the future. This is because for a being to truly have free will, he must have the power to make any person's belief about his future actions false. Say for example that God believes I will go to school tomorrow. Sure, there is a high probability that this will happen since I have class tomorrow. However, since I have free will, I must have the power of not going to school tomorrow. I must be able to make false God's belief that I will go to school tomorrow. So whatever belief God may have about my future actions, I must have the power to make them false. Therefore, as long as it's possible that God's beliefs about my future actions are false, he cannot know them with absolute certainty.
There is a couple ways around this but none of them seem plausible. One can say that my future act caused God to have a past belief about my future act. So, my future act of going to school tomorrow caused God today (and forever stretching back into eternity) to have the belief that I will go to school tomorrow. The problem that Swinburne shows with this in his book The Christian God is that causes must always precede their effects. You can never have an event at a certain time t cause something to happen at a time before t. Another way to get around the free will problem is to say that God is outside of time so he sees all the events that have and will happen at once. However, as Swinburne points out in The Christian God, it is hard to make sense of the idea that a being can be outside of time.
In general, I would agree with Charles Seymour's idea of hell that he gives in A Theodicy of Hell. Generally, Seymour believes that God sends some people to hell to punish us for our past sins. Since we only committed a finite number of sins and each sin is only finitely wrong, we can only receive a finite amount of punishment. However, once the damned get to hell, they still have the free will to sin and God will punish them for those sins too. It is possible for those in hell to get out of hell and into heaven if they become good enough such that at some point in the future, they would have experienced all the punishment they deserve. I agree with Seymour that this view is compatible with a loving God. Here, I wrote a review of the book and here is a link where Charles Seymour summarizes it.
I think one can believe in the Christian God and still believe in evolution, as Swinburne does. I don't think there is much problem with interpreting some of the bible as fiction or interpreting some of it in a non-literal way. For example, one could believe the Garden of Eden never existed but still believe that there was a first man (call him Adam) who committed the first sin. This latter belief is compatible with evolution.
I'd say that's about it, that's the most plausible view of the Christian God I can see. (There's more to Swinburne's beliefs like those concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation that I didn't talk about here. I think those beliefs are plausible as well)
First, I would generally agree with Swinburne's view of the Christian God. He believes that God is all-knowing but doesn't know the future with absolute certainty. The reason why he holds this view is that he believes no being can have an incorrigible belief about what a free being will do in the future. This is because for a being to truly have free will, he must have the power to make any person's belief about his future actions false. Say for example that God believes I will go to school tomorrow. Sure, there is a high probability that this will happen since I have class tomorrow. However, since I have free will, I must have the power of not going to school tomorrow. I must be able to make false God's belief that I will go to school tomorrow. So whatever belief God may have about my future actions, I must have the power to make them false. Therefore, as long as it's possible that God's beliefs about my future actions are false, he cannot know them with absolute certainty.
There is a couple ways around this but none of them seem plausible. One can say that my future act caused God to have a past belief about my future act. So, my future act of going to school tomorrow caused God today (and forever stretching back into eternity) to have the belief that I will go to school tomorrow. The problem that Swinburne shows with this in his book The Christian God is that causes must always precede their effects. You can never have an event at a certain time t cause something to happen at a time before t. Another way to get around the free will problem is to say that God is outside of time so he sees all the events that have and will happen at once. However, as Swinburne points out in The Christian God, it is hard to make sense of the idea that a being can be outside of time.
In general, I would agree with Charles Seymour's idea of hell that he gives in A Theodicy of Hell. Generally, Seymour believes that God sends some people to hell to punish us for our past sins. Since we only committed a finite number of sins and each sin is only finitely wrong, we can only receive a finite amount of punishment. However, once the damned get to hell, they still have the free will to sin and God will punish them for those sins too. It is possible for those in hell to get out of hell and into heaven if they become good enough such that at some point in the future, they would have experienced all the punishment they deserve. I agree with Seymour that this view is compatible with a loving God. Here, I wrote a review of the book and here is a link where Charles Seymour summarizes it.
I think one can believe in the Christian God and still believe in evolution, as Swinburne does. I don't think there is much problem with interpreting some of the bible as fiction or interpreting some of it in a non-literal way. For example, one could believe the Garden of Eden never existed but still believe that there was a first man (call him Adam) who committed the first sin. This latter belief is compatible with evolution.
I'd say that's about it, that's the most plausible view of the Christian God I can see. (There's more to Swinburne's beliefs like those concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation that I didn't talk about here. I think those beliefs are plausible as well)
Friday, September 15, 2006
Moral Responsibility
Just posted a paper on my site critiquing Galen Strawson's argument. He argues that moral responsibility is impossible. Here's an excerpt:
"In order to be responsible for the way you are, say at a given time T3, you had to at an earlier time, say T2, choose how you were going to be. However, at T2, the choice of how to be would be dependent on who you were. Your beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. would determine that choice. So, there would have to be an earlier time, T1, where you choose to have the character that you had at T2. But then, at T1, your character would cause you to make a certain choice. And so on.
I think the infinite regress can be stopped when we take into account the fact that praise, blame, reward, and punishment are to be used to change people's desires. These tools work just as well regardless of how those desires got there. It is also important to note that when we blame someone for their present desires, we are blaming them because they are, in part, their present desires. When one says, "You are responsible for your actions" I think it means no more than, "Your character, which can be changed, is the cause of your actions." The infinite regress fails because it attempts to make a distinction between a person and their character. Strawson does this when he says that a person, at a given time, must choose their character. I think there is no distinction to be made and a person is constituted by their character. A person having a bad character is equivalent to the person being bad.
For the paper, go here.
"In order to be responsible for the way you are, say at a given time T3, you had to at an earlier time, say T2, choose how you were going to be. However, at T2, the choice of how to be would be dependent on who you were. Your beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. would determine that choice. So, there would have to be an earlier time, T1, where you choose to have the character that you had at T2. But then, at T1, your character would cause you to make a certain choice. And so on.
You never get to a time where you chose how you would be that didn't depend on an earlier choosing of yours. If you do get to such a point, say when you were born, you cannot be held responsible for how you were at that point. You can only be held responsible for what you choose, and when you were born, you were "given" your desires. They weren't the result of any choice. So, since who we were initially caused us to choose our character again and again, it follows that to blame someone for their current character is equivalent to blaming someone for their initial character. However, since one isn't responsible for their initial character, one can't be responsible for their character at any other time, and hence cannot be held responsible for any act that they commit (given (1)).
...I think the infinite regress can be stopped when we take into account the fact that praise, blame, reward, and punishment are to be used to change people's desires. These tools work just as well regardless of how those desires got there. It is also important to note that when we blame someone for their present desires, we are blaming them because they are, in part, their present desires. When one says, "You are responsible for your actions" I think it means no more than, "Your character, which can be changed, is the cause of your actions." The infinite regress fails because it attempts to make a distinction between a person and their character. Strawson does this when he says that a person, at a given time, must choose their character. I think there is no distinction to be made and a person is constituted by their character. A person having a bad character is equivalent to the person being bad.
For the paper, go here.
Saturday, September 09, 2006
The Divine Tight-Rope Walker
Faith, Hope and Doubt
Louis Pojman
"Suppose you are fleeing a murderous gang of desperados, say the Mafia, who are bent on your annihilation. You come to the edge of a cliff which overlooks a yawning gorge. However, there is a rope spanning the gorge, tied to a tree on the cliff on the opposite side of the gorge. A man announces that he is a tight-rope walker who can carry you on the rope over the gorge. He doesn’t look like he can do it, so you wonder whether he is insane or simply overconfident. He takes a few steps on the rope to assure you that he can balance himself. You agree that it’s possible that he can navigate the rope across the gorge, but you have doubts whether he can carry you. But your options are limited. Soon your pursuers will be upon you. You must decide. While you still don’t believe that the “tight-rope walker” can save you, you decide to trust him. You place your faith in his ability, climb on his back, close your eyes (so as not to look down into the yawning gorge) and do your best to relax and obey his commands in adjusting your body as he steps onto the rope. You have a profound, even desperate, hope that he will be successful.
"This is how I see religious hope functioning in the midst of doubt. The verific person recognizes the tragedy of existence, that unless there is a God and life after death, the meaning of life is less than glorious, but if there is a God and life after death, that meaning is glorious. There is just enough evidence to whet his or her appetite, to inspire hope, a decision to live according to Theism or Christianity as an experimental hypothesis, but not enough evidence to cause belief. So keeping one’s mind open, the hoper plumbs for the better story, gets on the back of what may be the Divine Tight-Rope Walker and commits oneself to the pilgrimage. Perhaps the analogy is imperfect, for it may be possible to get off the tight-rope walker’s back in actual existence and to get back to the cliff. Perhaps the Mafia will make a wrong turn or take their time searching for you. Still the alternative to the Tight Rope Walker is not exactly welcoming: death and the extinction of all life in a solar system that will one day be extinguished. We may still learn to enjoy the fruits of finite love and resign ourselves to a final, cold fate.
...
"But if there is some evidence for something better, something eternal, someone benevolent who rules the universe and will redeem the world from evil and despair, isn’t it worth betting on this world view? Shouldn’t we, at least, consider getting on the back of the Tight-Rope Walker and letting him guide us across the gorge?"
I'm not saying I buy this argument, but it does seem interesting (of course, presuming that there is some evidence for the existence of God).
Louis Pojman
"Suppose you are fleeing a murderous gang of desperados, say the Mafia, who are bent on your annihilation. You come to the edge of a cliff which overlooks a yawning gorge. However, there is a rope spanning the gorge, tied to a tree on the cliff on the opposite side of the gorge. A man announces that he is a tight-rope walker who can carry you on the rope over the gorge. He doesn’t look like he can do it, so you wonder whether he is insane or simply overconfident. He takes a few steps on the rope to assure you that he can balance himself. You agree that it’s possible that he can navigate the rope across the gorge, but you have doubts whether he can carry you. But your options are limited. Soon your pursuers will be upon you. You must decide. While you still don’t believe that the “tight-rope walker” can save you, you decide to trust him. You place your faith in his ability, climb on his back, close your eyes (so as not to look down into the yawning gorge) and do your best to relax and obey his commands in adjusting your body as he steps onto the rope. You have a profound, even desperate, hope that he will be successful.
"This is how I see religious hope functioning in the midst of doubt. The verific person recognizes the tragedy of existence, that unless there is a God and life after death, the meaning of life is less than glorious, but if there is a God and life after death, that meaning is glorious. There is just enough evidence to whet his or her appetite, to inspire hope, a decision to live according to Theism or Christianity as an experimental hypothesis, but not enough evidence to cause belief. So keeping one’s mind open, the hoper plumbs for the better story, gets on the back of what may be the Divine Tight-Rope Walker and commits oneself to the pilgrimage. Perhaps the analogy is imperfect, for it may be possible to get off the tight-rope walker’s back in actual existence and to get back to the cliff. Perhaps the Mafia will make a wrong turn or take their time searching for you. Still the alternative to the Tight Rope Walker is not exactly welcoming: death and the extinction of all life in a solar system that will one day be extinguished. We may still learn to enjoy the fruits of finite love and resign ourselves to a final, cold fate.
...
"But if there is some evidence for something better, something eternal, someone benevolent who rules the universe and will redeem the world from evil and despair, isn’t it worth betting on this world view? Shouldn’t we, at least, consider getting on the back of the Tight-Rope Walker and letting him guide us across the gorge?"
I'm not saying I buy this argument, but it does seem interesting (of course, presuming that there is some evidence for the existence of God).
Louis Pojman
Louis Pojman is a well-known ethicist who has written many good books on the topic. He taught at WestPoint Academy for 9 years before his death. I have read one of his books and found it to be the best introduction to ethics I have read. That being Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 5th Edition. He died on October 15th of last year of liver cancer, cirrhosis, and hepatitis C. More on his life and death can be seen here.
He has taught me many things about ethics as I'm sure others would say who have read his work. It is fortunate that he existed and it seems left the world a better place than it otherwise would have been.
He has taught me many things about ethics as I'm sure others would say who have read his work. It is fortunate that he existed and it seems left the world a better place than it otherwise would have been.
"I don't want it, therefore they should stop it."
Many people use this argument when it comes to things that will inconvenience them. They shouldn't raise taxes because I don't want to pay them. They shouldn't raise tuition because I don't want to pay it. They shouldn't put a dump in our town because I don't want it. They shouldn't start mining in Sand Canyon because it'll create more traffic (trucks in the mining company) on the freeway and I don't want that. They should stop building more houses in my town because then more people will be here which will cause more traffic. They should lower gas prices because I don't want to pay them. And so on.
However, simply because people or a group of people don't want higher taxes, that doesn't imply that higher taxes aren't necessary. The same goes for dumps. Dumps are a necessary thing and they have to be put somewhere. If they're not put in your town, they will simply be put in another town where the people don't speak up (and of course, it might cost you more taxes because your trash will have to get shipped out further).
It amazes me how people don't bother looking into whether the tax, raise in tuition, dump, or mining, is actually necessary. They don't care if it's done for a good reason. They automatically assume that it's done for a bad reason and therefore, they don't want it to happen.
I would suggest that anyone who is against something because it will inconvenience them to actually look into the issue and see if the measure is necessary (i.e., done for a good reason). If (and only if) it is done for a bad reason (technically, if it's a measure a good person would be against), then one should be against it. Whether or not it inconveniences you or the general public is something of relevance, but is something that (given a good enough reason) can be overridden.
However, simply because people or a group of people don't want higher taxes, that doesn't imply that higher taxes aren't necessary. The same goes for dumps. Dumps are a necessary thing and they have to be put somewhere. If they're not put in your town, they will simply be put in another town where the people don't speak up (and of course, it might cost you more taxes because your trash will have to get shipped out further).
It amazes me how people don't bother looking into whether the tax, raise in tuition, dump, or mining, is actually necessary. They don't care if it's done for a good reason. They automatically assume that it's done for a bad reason and therefore, they don't want it to happen.
I would suggest that anyone who is against something because it will inconvenience them to actually look into the issue and see if the measure is necessary (i.e., done for a good reason). If (and only if) it is done for a bad reason (technically, if it's a measure a good person would be against), then one should be against it. Whether or not it inconveniences you or the general public is something of relevance, but is something that (given a good enough reason) can be overridden.
Sunday, August 13, 2006
"At a single stroke, Buffett has given purpose to his life"
On Happiness, Money and Giving it Away
Peter Singer
Project Syndicate, July, 2006
Would you be happier if you were richer? Many people believe that they would be. But research conducted over many years suggests that greater wealth implies greater happiness only at quite low levels of income.
Peter Singer
Project Syndicate, July, 2006
Would you be happier if you were richer? Many people believe that they would be. But research conducted over many years suggests that greater wealth implies greater happiness only at quite low levels of income.
People in the United States, for example, are, on average, richer than New Zealanders, but they are not happier.
...
Consider, in this light, the life of the American investor Warren Buffett. For 50 years, Buffett, now 75, has worked at accumulating a vast fortune. According to Forbes magazine, he is the second wealthiest person in the world, after Bill Gates, with assets of US$42 billion. Yet his frugal lifestyle shows that he does not particularly enjoy spending large amounts of money. Even if his tastes were more lavish, he would be hard-pressed to spend more than a tiny fraction of his wealth.
From this perspective, once Buffett earned his first few millions in the 1960s, his efforts to accumulate more money can easily seem completely pointless... Coincidentally, Kahneman’s article appeared the same week that Buffett announced the largest philanthropic donation in US history — US$30 billion to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and another US$7 billion to other charitable foundations. Even when the donations made by Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller are adjusted for inflation, Buffett’s is greater. At a single stroke, Buffett has given purpose to his life.
Introductory works on ethics
I want to list a couple of good resources for the person who would like to study ethics. Ethics is a subject I think everyone should devote much time and effort to. Deciding what is right or wrong is probably the most important decision to decide. It is not something people should take lightly and just "go with their gut" or "go with what their parents believe" or "go with what their religion teaches" or "go with what most of society believes." However, our gut, religion, parents, and society, are not as reliable as sound argument.
One might say that studying ethics is pointless. Why read papers on abortion or capital punishment? There's always a way out of every argument and there's always an excuse to give on why one won't accept a given argument. What makes little sense is even if studying ethics was pointless, these people will simply resort to one of the above ways of deciding what is right or wrong. I'll use my gut or what a thousand-year-old text says or what my parents/society has taught me, etc.
I also see little merit in the idea that "there is always a way out of every argument. Therefore, there is no point to looking at both sides of the issue because in the end, you just believe what you want anways." I have a hard time believing this because I have found it to be false time and time again. I have had my mind changed by arguments that people have given. I have been able to recognize my mistakes by looking into the issue. I have also been able to strengthen my beliefs by doing the same. It is often the people who have never looked into ethical issues substantially who say this. This shows that they are simply not concerned with the truth and are to blame for it.
So, it is true that there may be a response one can always give to an argument. The question, however, is whether it is a good or bad response. The question is not whether there exists arguments, but whether they are good or bad arguments. If you look at people debating issues and say, "Oh no this is too hard for me, everyone is arguing. There can't be any use in looking into this anymore," then you have given up on the truth.
It is good to study ethics mainly because of the danger of living a lie. I would hate to have lived my life during the Civil War fighting for slavery, believing with all my heart that it was my duty. I would hate to have been an accomplice in the Holocaust, believing that God really did command me to kill the Jews. I would hate to have ruined innocent lives simply because I was too blind to see the truth.
So, I do not want to cause any undue harm to others or to myself. In being concerned with this, as I imagine most others are as well, this gives me good reason to study ethics and to, as honestly as I can, look at both sides of any given issue. I encourage you to do the same.
Now for the list of good introductory works.
Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong ,Fifth Edition by Pojman is my favorite introduction. A cheaper version of the book, the fourth edition, is available here.
Alonzo Fyfe's online introduction can be viewed here, his is extremely good as well.
For a good set of introductory ethical readings, Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, Seventh Edition is recommended. Here is a link to the cheaper sixth edition. Here is a link to the fifth edition, which seems to be selling for about ten bucks cheaper.
On a sidenote, I really want to get some philosophy t-shirts. I would like them to be fairly nice and say things like "Aristotle" on the front and perhaps a quote on the back. Then, I could find the philosopher's birthdays and wear the shirt on that day and it would be Aristotle Day or Kant Day. Wouldn't that be neat?
One might say that studying ethics is pointless. Why read papers on abortion or capital punishment? There's always a way out of every argument and there's always an excuse to give on why one won't accept a given argument. What makes little sense is even if studying ethics was pointless, these people will simply resort to one of the above ways of deciding what is right or wrong. I'll use my gut or what a thousand-year-old text says or what my parents/society has taught me, etc.
I also see little merit in the idea that "there is always a way out of every argument. Therefore, there is no point to looking at both sides of the issue because in the end, you just believe what you want anways." I have a hard time believing this because I have found it to be false time and time again. I have had my mind changed by arguments that people have given. I have been able to recognize my mistakes by looking into the issue. I have also been able to strengthen my beliefs by doing the same. It is often the people who have never looked into ethical issues substantially who say this. This shows that they are simply not concerned with the truth and are to blame for it.
So, it is true that there may be a response one can always give to an argument. The question, however, is whether it is a good or bad response. The question is not whether there exists arguments, but whether they are good or bad arguments. If you look at people debating issues and say, "Oh no this is too hard for me, everyone is arguing. There can't be any use in looking into this anymore," then you have given up on the truth.
It is good to study ethics mainly because of the danger of living a lie. I would hate to have lived my life during the Civil War fighting for slavery, believing with all my heart that it was my duty. I would hate to have been an accomplice in the Holocaust, believing that God really did command me to kill the Jews. I would hate to have ruined innocent lives simply because I was too blind to see the truth.
So, I do not want to cause any undue harm to others or to myself. In being concerned with this, as I imagine most others are as well, this gives me good reason to study ethics and to, as honestly as I can, look at both sides of any given issue. I encourage you to do the same.
Now for the list of good introductory works.
Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong ,Fifth Edition by Pojman is my favorite introduction. A cheaper version of the book, the fourth edition, is available here.
Alonzo Fyfe's online introduction can be viewed here, his is extremely good as well.
For a good set of introductory ethical readings, Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, Seventh Edition is recommended. Here is a link to the cheaper sixth edition. Here is a link to the fifth edition, which seems to be selling for about ten bucks cheaper.
On a sidenote, I really want to get some philosophy t-shirts. I would like them to be fairly nice and say things like "Aristotle" on the front and perhaps a quote on the back. Then, I could find the philosopher's birthdays and wear the shirt on that day and it would be Aristotle Day or Kant Day. Wouldn't that be neat?
Saturday, August 05, 2006
"You can't be pro-war and pro-life"
Yesterday, I noticed one of my co-workers had a sticker on her car proclaiming this statement. It was most likely against political conservatives who are generally against abortion (pro-life) and also for some wars (pro-war). Whether either of these positions is tenable is not something that will be addressed. What will be addressed is whether someone can hold both positions and be consistent.
Definitions
There is a definition of each term that, when it is used, creates a contradiction. However, these definitions are ones that no one would use in normal discourse. If by "pro-life", one meant, "It is always wrong to kill any human being," then that would clearly contradict with the statement that it is sometimes permissible (or obligatory) to kill a human being (as it is in some wars).
However, when someone is pro-life, they do not need to agree that all killing is morally prohibited. They only need to agree that killing a fetus (in general) is morally prohibited. They may base this on the judgment that in general, it is wrong to kill an innocent person (and of course stating that fetuses are persons).
If someone is "pro-war", they do not need to agree with any and all wars that may occur. One can (if I understand the term correctly) be pro-war and agree that some wars shouldn't have taken place and some are inevitable. This would be better characterized by the term "pro-some-wars."
Reconciliation
So, if one believes that in general it is wrong to kill an innocent person and one also thinks that some wars are necessary, how does one reconcile the two statements? One way they can do so is to claim that in the wars that are justified, the people who are to be killed are not innocent. They may give an example of the people who committed the Holocaust (or were fighting to defend the Holocaust). Were they innocent people? Clearly not.
However, that is not the only way the two statements can be reconciled. Many wars cause innocent bystanders to die (wives, children, good soldiers, etc.) who had nothing to do with the crimes committed. In this case, one can still respond that, sure some innocent people had to die but that there was an overriding reason to go ahead with the war. To bring back the example of the Holocaust, one may say that some US soldiers and perhaps some German (and other nationality) children died that shouldn't have. However, in sacrificing their lives, we have stopped and punished those who have killed many more lives. We also stopped them from killing even more people.
Most people are best characterized as "anti-war." They agree that war is something that is bad and in general, should be avoided. However, they would agree that some wars are necessary. They are best characterized as "pro-some-wars." Some of the people who are "pro-some-wars" are also "pro-life."
Killing the Innocent
The majority of people are against killing the innocent in most cases. If this were coupled with the belief that a fetus is an innocent person, then one would have to be against most instances of killing fetuses. Where the battle comes down to in the abortion debate is whether the fetus is a person or not. If one agrees that the fetus is an innocent person, and is against killing innocent people, then one would have to be pro-life.
If one is against killing innocent people, they will not be against all wars. Some wars occur (or can occur) at too great a cost. If too many innocent people die and not enough good comes of it, then the war is not worth it. They will then be "pro-war" in the sense that they believe some wars are (overall) good and some wars are (overall) bad.
Conclusion
So, there is no necessary contradiction between the two positions of being "pro-life" and "pro-war" given that both terms are used in the way that most people use them. If someone believes that, in general, killing innocent people is wrong, they can be pro-life and pro-war given that "pro-war" doesn't mean "for any and all wars that are (and can be) committed."
The statement, "You can't be pro-war and pro-life" is only true if one defines "pro-war" in a way that characterizes nobody. No person is for any and all wars that can happen. Given this, it is possible to be both pro-war and pro-life.
Definitions
There is a definition of each term that, when it is used, creates a contradiction. However, these definitions are ones that no one would use in normal discourse. If by "pro-life", one meant, "It is always wrong to kill any human being," then that would clearly contradict with the statement that it is sometimes permissible (or obligatory) to kill a human being (as it is in some wars).
However, when someone is pro-life, they do not need to agree that all killing is morally prohibited. They only need to agree that killing a fetus (in general) is morally prohibited. They may base this on the judgment that in general, it is wrong to kill an innocent person (and of course stating that fetuses are persons).
If someone is "pro-war", they do not need to agree with any and all wars that may occur. One can (if I understand the term correctly) be pro-war and agree that some wars shouldn't have taken place and some are inevitable. This would be better characterized by the term "pro-some-wars."
Reconciliation
So, if one believes that in general it is wrong to kill an innocent person and one also thinks that some wars are necessary, how does one reconcile the two statements? One way they can do so is to claim that in the wars that are justified, the people who are to be killed are not innocent. They may give an example of the people who committed the Holocaust (or were fighting to defend the Holocaust). Were they innocent people? Clearly not.
However, that is not the only way the two statements can be reconciled. Many wars cause innocent bystanders to die (wives, children, good soldiers, etc.) who had nothing to do with the crimes committed. In this case, one can still respond that, sure some innocent people had to die but that there was an overriding reason to go ahead with the war. To bring back the example of the Holocaust, one may say that some US soldiers and perhaps some German (and other nationality) children died that shouldn't have. However, in sacrificing their lives, we have stopped and punished those who have killed many more lives. We also stopped them from killing even more people.
Most people are best characterized as "anti-war." They agree that war is something that is bad and in general, should be avoided. However, they would agree that some wars are necessary. They are best characterized as "pro-some-wars." Some of the people who are "pro-some-wars" are also "pro-life."
Killing the Innocent
The majority of people are against killing the innocent in most cases. If this were coupled with the belief that a fetus is an innocent person, then one would have to be against most instances of killing fetuses. Where the battle comes down to in the abortion debate is whether the fetus is a person or not. If one agrees that the fetus is an innocent person, and is against killing innocent people, then one would have to be pro-life.
If one is against killing innocent people, they will not be against all wars. Some wars occur (or can occur) at too great a cost. If too many innocent people die and not enough good comes of it, then the war is not worth it. They will then be "pro-war" in the sense that they believe some wars are (overall) good and some wars are (overall) bad.
Conclusion
So, there is no necessary contradiction between the two positions of being "pro-life" and "pro-war" given that both terms are used in the way that most people use them. If someone believes that, in general, killing innocent people is wrong, they can be pro-life and pro-war given that "pro-war" doesn't mean "for any and all wars that are (and can be) committed."
The statement, "You can't be pro-war and pro-life" is only true if one defines "pro-war" in a way that characterizes nobody. No person is for any and all wars that can happen. Given this, it is possible to be both pro-war and pro-life.
Sunday, July 09, 2006
Subjectivism and Ted Bundy on rape
"In any case, let me assure you, my dear young lady, that there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure that I might take in eating ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you."
Ted Bundy, a man who raped and murdered many innocent women, is quoted from in the book: Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong by Pojman.
When people do wrong acts, they look for any way out that will justify what they are doing. "Everyone else is doing it," "No one is perfect," "It doesn't hurt that much," "Why not steal five dollars, they'll never know the difference," etc. I thought Ted Bundy's was especially interesting. It is also telling against the ethical theory called Subjectivism. Ethical subjectivism states that morality is a matter of taste like preferring vanilla ice cream to chocolate. If someone is against rape, it's simply a matter of taste and nothing more. If someone is for killing the Jews, it's no different from preferring ketchup on your hot dog.
I think this view is very wrong. One big reason is the absurd results that come of it. We don't punish people for matters of taste. We would never say, "I like vanilla ice cream, you don't like vanilla? Well then you should be in prison." However, there are certain wrong acts that we do and should punish people for.
It also makes it impossible to criticize others for their moral views. I would never write a paper arguing why someone should prefer vanilla ice cream over chocolate or why they should enjoy mustard over ketchup on their hot dog. It would make no sense to attempt to change someone's preferences in these areas. However, it does make sense and there is good reason to attempt to justify your moral views and to show how other ones are unjustified.
In other words, if someone says to you, "I like coffee with no sugar," they don't have to give arguments and evidence for why. The simple fact that they like it is enough. However, if someone says, "I like killing 7 year olds on the weekends," then they must give evidence and argument to back it up (and so would the person who says they don't like killing 7 year olds on the weekends).
Alright enough of that. Now for some Ted Bundy.
"Then I learned that all moral judgments are 'value judgments,' that all value judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either 'right' or 'wrong.' I even read somewhere that the Chief Justice of the United States had written that the American Constitution expressed nothing more than collective value judgments. Believe it or not, I figured out for myself--what apparently the Chief Justice couldn't figure out for himself--that if the rationality of one value judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one whit more rational. Nor is there any 'reason' to obey the law for anyone, like myself, who has the boldness and daring--the strength of character--to throw off its shackles...I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the insupportable 'value judgment' that I was bound to respect the rights of others. I asked myself, who were these 'others?' Other human beings, with human rights? Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer? Is your life more than a hog's life to a hog? Why should I be willing to sacrifice my pleasure more for the one than for the other? Surely, you would not, in this age of scientific enlightenment, declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as 'moral' or 'good' and others as 'immoral' or 'bad'? In any case, let me assure you, my dear young lady, that there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure that I might take in eating ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you. That is the honest conclusion to which my education has led me--after the most conscientious examination of my spontaneous and inhibited self."--Ted Bundy, Quoted from Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 5th edition, p.30
As a sidenote, I am also reminded of the statement of Frank T. J. Mackey (played by Tom Cruise) from the movie Magnolia. He is a motivational speaker in a sense but he motivates guys to (in his words) "tame the cunt." He teaches men how to get women to be all over them and to get them in bed. He justifies this by saying the following:
"I will not apologize for what I want. I will not apologize for what I need. I will not apologize for who I am."
I hope I have made it clear by now that there are some cases where one should apologize for who they are. I hope I have made it clear that ethical subjectivism is a bad position. I hope I have made it clear how important it is to be a good person and to study the subject of ethics so that you too will not fall into the trap of living a lie like Ted Bundy did.
Ted Bundy, a man who raped and murdered many innocent women, is quoted from in the book: Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong by Pojman.
When people do wrong acts, they look for any way out that will justify what they are doing. "Everyone else is doing it," "No one is perfect," "It doesn't hurt that much," "Why not steal five dollars, they'll never know the difference," etc. I thought Ted Bundy's was especially interesting. It is also telling against the ethical theory called Subjectivism. Ethical subjectivism states that morality is a matter of taste like preferring vanilla ice cream to chocolate. If someone is against rape, it's simply a matter of taste and nothing more. If someone is for killing the Jews, it's no different from preferring ketchup on your hot dog.
I think this view is very wrong. One big reason is the absurd results that come of it. We don't punish people for matters of taste. We would never say, "I like vanilla ice cream, you don't like vanilla? Well then you should be in prison." However, there are certain wrong acts that we do and should punish people for.
It also makes it impossible to criticize others for their moral views. I would never write a paper arguing why someone should prefer vanilla ice cream over chocolate or why they should enjoy mustard over ketchup on their hot dog. It would make no sense to attempt to change someone's preferences in these areas. However, it does make sense and there is good reason to attempt to justify your moral views and to show how other ones are unjustified.
In other words, if someone says to you, "I like coffee with no sugar," they don't have to give arguments and evidence for why. The simple fact that they like it is enough. However, if someone says, "I like killing 7 year olds on the weekends," then they must give evidence and argument to back it up (and so would the person who says they don't like killing 7 year olds on the weekends).
Alright enough of that. Now for some Ted Bundy.
"Then I learned that all moral judgments are 'value judgments,' that all value judgments are subjective, and that none can be proved to be either 'right' or 'wrong.' I even read somewhere that the Chief Justice of the United States had written that the American Constitution expressed nothing more than collective value judgments. Believe it or not, I figured out for myself--what apparently the Chief Justice couldn't figure out for himself--that if the rationality of one value judgment was zero, multiplying it by millions would not make it one whit more rational. Nor is there any 'reason' to obey the law for anyone, like myself, who has the boldness and daring--the strength of character--to throw off its shackles...I discovered that to become truly free, truly unfettered, I had to become truly uninhibited. And I quickly discovered that the greatest obstacle to my freedom, the greatest block and limitation to it, consists in the insupportable 'value judgment' that I was bound to respect the rights of others. I asked myself, who were these 'others?' Other human beings, with human rights? Why is it more wrong to kill a human animal than any other animal, a pig or a sheep or a steer? Is your life more than a hog's life to a hog? Why should I be willing to sacrifice my pleasure more for the one than for the other? Surely, you would not, in this age of scientific enlightenment, declare that God or nature has marked some pleasures as 'moral' or 'good' and others as 'immoral' or 'bad'? In any case, let me assure you, my dear young lady, that there is absolutely no comparison between the pleasure that I might take in eating ham and the pleasure I anticipate in raping and murdering you. That is the honest conclusion to which my education has led me--after the most conscientious examination of my spontaneous and inhibited self."--Ted Bundy, Quoted from Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 5th edition, p.30
As a sidenote, I am also reminded of the statement of Frank T. J. Mackey (played by Tom Cruise) from the movie Magnolia. He is a motivational speaker in a sense but he motivates guys to (in his words) "tame the cunt." He teaches men how to get women to be all over them and to get them in bed. He justifies this by saying the following:
"I will not apologize for what I want. I will not apologize for what I need. I will not apologize for who I am."
I hope I have made it clear by now that there are some cases where one should apologize for who they are. I hope I have made it clear that ethical subjectivism is a bad position. I hope I have made it clear how important it is to be a good person and to study the subject of ethics so that you too will not fall into the trap of living a lie like Ted Bundy did.
"You cannot punish me because you are not perfect"
Rationalizations: The Perfection Argument
Simply because I got a tattoo as a kid or smoked cigarettes does not mean that I believe now that I was justified in performing those activities. One example of the use of this argument was in the show The Osbournes. Jack, who is Ozzy Osbourne's son, smokes and does drugs. Whenever Ozzy would yell at him for doing drugs, Jack would reply with, "You did drugs when you were younger. You are a hypocrite to tell me to not do any."
However, this response confuses the definition of “hypocrisy.” A hypocrite is one who says, “When I do X it is okay but when you do X, it is wrong.” Ozzy would be a hypocrite if he believed that when he did drugs as a young boy it was okay but wrong for his son. However, if he believes that it was wrong for him to do and wrong for his son to do, then he avoids hypocrisy. He can then tell his son to not do drugs and if he does them, he will be punished, despite the son’s sayings otherwise.
Victimless Crimes
Yesterday, while I was finishing going pee in the bathroom, I realized something. The argument that a certain crime is victimless begs the question. Allow me to elaborate.
Let's take druge laws. A lot of time, people argue that with drug laws, when people break them, it is a victimless crime. It is a crime where there is no victim. No one is being wronged in the situation. Since no one is being wronged, there should be no law against it.
However, why not consider the person who is taking drugs to be a victim? Perhaps he is a victim of the big tobacco companies who just want him to get hooked because they want to be rich. Perhaps he is a victim of an alcohol company who wants the same.
But not only that, to say a crime is victimless is equivalent to saying that the crime is not wrong. There is only a "victim" in a certain situation when a wrong act was committed. So, starting from the statement "This crime is victimless" is just simply equivalent to saying, "This crime is not wrong." Therefore,one cannot use the claim, "This crime is victimless" to prove "This crime is not wrong." If someone already believes the crime to be wrong, they will not think it is victimless. Minimally, in the drug-taking situation, one could argue that the drug user is wronging himself. He could further argue that big companies are wronging him as well.
So, the argument that "X is a victimless crime" to prove that "This crime is not wrong" does not work.
(One could prove that there is no victim by saying that the person taking the drugs is harming himself but not wronging himself. I see this as a very impossible argument to make. If one did make that argument, however, they would not be begging the question.)
Let's take druge laws. A lot of time, people argue that with drug laws, when people break them, it is a victimless crime. It is a crime where there is no victim. No one is being wronged in the situation. Since no one is being wronged, there should be no law against it.
However, why not consider the person who is taking drugs to be a victim? Perhaps he is a victim of the big tobacco companies who just want him to get hooked because they want to be rich. Perhaps he is a victim of an alcohol company who wants the same.
But not only that, to say a crime is victimless is equivalent to saying that the crime is not wrong. There is only a "victim" in a certain situation when a wrong act was committed. So, starting from the statement "This crime is victimless" is just simply equivalent to saying, "This crime is not wrong." Therefore,one cannot use the claim, "This crime is victimless" to prove "This crime is not wrong." If someone already believes the crime to be wrong, they will not think it is victimless. Minimally, in the drug-taking situation, one could argue that the drug user is wronging himself. He could further argue that big companies are wronging him as well.
So, the argument that "X is a victimless crime" to prove that "This crime is not wrong" does not work.
(One could prove that there is no victim by saying that the person taking the drugs is harming himself but not wronging himself. I see this as a very impossible argument to make. If one did make that argument, however, they would not be begging the question.)
The Singer Solution to World Poverty--Something all humans need to really think about
The Singer Solution to World Poverty
Peter Singer
The New York Times Sunday Magazine, September 5, 1999, pp. 60-63
"In the Brazilian film "Central Station," Dora is a retired schoolteacher who makes ends meet by sitting at the station writing letters for illiterate people. Suddenly she has an opportunity to pocket $1,000. All she has to do is persuade a homeless 9-year-old boy to follow her to an address she has been given. (She is told he will be adopted by wealthy foreigners.) She delivers the boy, gets the money, spends some of it on a television set and settles down to enjoy her new acquisition. Her neighbor spoils the fun, however, by telling her that the boy was too old to be adopted —he will be killed and his organs sold for transplantation. Perhaps Dora knew this all along, but after her neighbor's plain speaking, she spends a troubled night. In the morning Dora resolves to take the boy back.
Suppose Dora had told her neighbor that it is a tough world, other people have nice new TV's too, and if selling the kid is the only way she can get one, well, he was only a street kid. She would then have become, in the eyes of the audience, a monster. She redeems herself only by being prepared to bear considerable risks to save the boy.
At the end of the movie, in cinemas in the affluent nations of the world, people who would have been quick to condemn Dora if she had not rescued the boy go home to places far more comfortable than her apartment. In fact, the average family in the United States spends almost one-third of its income on things that are no more necessary to them than Dora's new TV was to her. Going out to nice restaurants, buying new clothes because the old ones are no longer stylish, vacationing at beach resorts —so much of our income is spent on things not essential to the preservation of our lives and health. Donated to one of a number of charitable agencies, that money could mean the difference between life and death for children in need.
All of which raises a question: In the end, what is the ethical distinction between a Brazilian who sells a homeless child to organ peddlers and an American who already has a TV and upgrades to a better one —knowing that the money could be donated to an organization that would use it to save the lives of kids in need?"
...
However, why think this will happen? There is no evidence that the people who are near death would just do nothing once they didn't have to worry about malnutrition and death of loved ones and sickness, etc. Imagine that we cured people of their sickness, gave them a sufficient amount of food, gave them a nice place to live, set up factories where they could work, and said, "Okay, if you want to keep what you have, you must work."
I think most people who are near death would agree to these conditions. I think most people who are suffering from malnutrition wouldn't mind working once they got enough food and water and shelter to do so.
Peter Singer
The New York Times Sunday Magazine, September 5, 1999, pp. 60-63
"In the Brazilian film "Central Station," Dora is a retired schoolteacher who makes ends meet by sitting at the station writing letters for illiterate people. Suddenly she has an opportunity to pocket $1,000. All she has to do is persuade a homeless 9-year-old boy to follow her to an address she has been given. (She is told he will be adopted by wealthy foreigners.) She delivers the boy, gets the money, spends some of it on a television set and settles down to enjoy her new acquisition. Her neighbor spoils the fun, however, by telling her that the boy was too old to be adopted —he will be killed and his organs sold for transplantation. Perhaps Dora knew this all along, but after her neighbor's plain speaking, she spends a troubled night. In the morning Dora resolves to take the boy back.
Suppose Dora had told her neighbor that it is a tough world, other people have nice new TV's too, and if selling the kid is the only way she can get one, well, he was only a street kid. She would then have become, in the eyes of the audience, a monster. She redeems herself only by being prepared to bear considerable risks to save the boy.
At the end of the movie, in cinemas in the affluent nations of the world, people who would have been quick to condemn Dora if she had not rescued the boy go home to places far more comfortable than her apartment. In fact, the average family in the United States spends almost one-third of its income on things that are no more necessary to them than Dora's new TV was to her. Going out to nice restaurants, buying new clothes because the old ones are no longer stylish, vacationing at beach resorts —so much of our income is spent on things not essential to the preservation of our lives and health. Donated to one of a number of charitable agencies, that money could mean the difference between life and death for children in need.
All of which raises a question: In the end, what is the ethical distinction between a Brazilian who sells a homeless child to organ peddlers and an American who already has a TV and upgrades to a better one —knowing that the money could be donated to an organization that would use it to save the lives of kids in need?"
...
"In the world as it is now, I can see no escape from the conclusion that each one of us with wealth surplus to his or her essential needs should be giving most of it to help people suffering from poverty so dire as to be life-threatening. That's right: I'm saying that you shouldn't buy that new car, take that cruise, redecorate the house or get that pricey new suit. After all, a $1,000 suit could save five children's lives.
So how does my philosophy break down in dollars and cents? An American household with an income of $50,000 spends around $30,000 annually on necessities, according to the Conference Board, a nonprofit economic research organization. Therefore, for a household bringing in $50,000 a year, donations to help the world's poor should be as close as possible to $20,000. The $30,000 required for necessities holds for higher incomes as well. So a household making $100,000 could cut a yearly check for $70,000. Again, the formula is simple: whatever money you're spending on luxuries, not necessities, should be given away."
Some may argue against his proposal. They might say that since the money is just being given away without any incentive, people will take what they wish and not do things like get a job or start to support themselves. These people will live longer and reproduce. Therefore, giving more aid would simply create more need, not less of it.However, why think this will happen? There is no evidence that the people who are near death would just do nothing once they didn't have to worry about malnutrition and death of loved ones and sickness, etc. Imagine that we cured people of their sickness, gave them a sufficient amount of food, gave them a nice place to live, set up factories where they could work, and said, "Okay, if you want to keep what you have, you must work."
I think most people who are near death would agree to these conditions. I think most people who are suffering from malnutrition wouldn't mind working once they got enough food and water and shelter to do so.
There is no good reason why essentially all Americans cannot give aid to dying countries. The price of a new TV is not just a couple thousand dollars, it's a couple hundred lives.
See my paper on possible objections to giving aid here.Tuesday, March 28, 2006
"God created life, therefore He has the right to take it away"
In the Bible, (1 Sam 15:3 to be exact) God orders the killing of infants. In defense of God's command, Norman L. Geisler, Ph. D., argues that since God is the originator of life, he has the right to take it away if he wishes. We, as humans, do not have this same right because we did not create life. The quote is as follows:
"An atheist once brought up this issue in a debate, and I responded by saying, 'God created life and he has the right to take it. If you can create life, then you can have the right to take it. But if you can't create it, you don't have that right.' And the audience applauded.
People assume that what's wrong for us is wrong for God. However, it's wrong for me to take your life, because I didn't make it and I don't own it. For example, it's wrong for me to go into your yard and pull up your bushes, cut them down, kill them, transplant them, move them around. I can do that in my yard, because I own the bushes in my yard.
"Well, God is sovereign over all of life and he has the right to take it if he wishes. In fact, we tend to forget that God takes the life of every human being. It's called death. The only question is when and how, which we leave up to him." (p. 119)
There are numerous problems with this. One main problem is that the premise "If a being creates life, then he has the right to destroy it" is false. Imagine there existed an evil being who created life. He tortures people for the fun of it and kills them for the same reason. Certainly, this being killing people for the fun of it is wrong. However, if it's the case that whoever creates life has the right to destroy it, then killing people for fun would be okay, given that you created them in the first place.
What matters is not whether the being created life. What matters is the reason(s) that one has for killing. This can be seen by noticing that humans have the right to take life in certain circumstances. There are cases where killing would be permissible and even obligatory (in times of war, to protect a loved one, etc.).
Another problem with this is how he talks about ownership. He makes an analogy between God owning human lives and us owning the bushes in our yard. The major, rather obvious problem with this is that humans cannot legitimately be owned. Person A cannot own person B legitimately. Sure, one may have a case where a slave is owned by his slaveowner, but that would be wrong. To say that slavery is wrong means that no person can own another person legitimately. Hence, the analogy fails to establish its point.
If God owns our lives in any sense, then he is evil. The same way that a slaveowner is evil. The same way that a person who created beings for the sole purpose of owning them would be evil. Only person A can legitimately "own" Person A's life. Certainly humans are not property.
So, those are the problems with the defense that since God created life, he has the right to take it away. Affirming this implies affirming the general principle that if a being creates life, then he has the right to take it away. This general principle has 2 main problems:
1. It fails to call evil a being who creates life for the sole purpose to enjoy destroying it.
2. It relies on the idea that a being can own a human. Only an evil being would attempt to own a human.
Therefore, the general principle fails to justify a God who would command the killing of infants. Norman L. Geisler, Ph.D., is wrong.
For a more thorough discussion of the killing of infants and various attempts by Christians to justify it, go here.
"An atheist once brought up this issue in a debate, and I responded by saying, 'God created life and he has the right to take it. If you can create life, then you can have the right to take it. But if you can't create it, you don't have that right.' And the audience applauded.
People assume that what's wrong for us is wrong for God. However, it's wrong for me to take your life, because I didn't make it and I don't own it. For example, it's wrong for me to go into your yard and pull up your bushes, cut them down, kill them, transplant them, move them around. I can do that in my yard, because I own the bushes in my yard.
"Well, God is sovereign over all of life and he has the right to take it if he wishes. In fact, we tend to forget that God takes the life of every human being. It's called death. The only question is when and how, which we leave up to him." (p. 119)
There are numerous problems with this. One main problem is that the premise "If a being creates life, then he has the right to destroy it" is false. Imagine there existed an evil being who created life. He tortures people for the fun of it and kills them for the same reason. Certainly, this being killing people for the fun of it is wrong. However, if it's the case that whoever creates life has the right to destroy it, then killing people for fun would be okay, given that you created them in the first place.
What matters is not whether the being created life. What matters is the reason(s) that one has for killing. This can be seen by noticing that humans have the right to take life in certain circumstances. There are cases where killing would be permissible and even obligatory (in times of war, to protect a loved one, etc.).
Another problem with this is how he talks about ownership. He makes an analogy between God owning human lives and us owning the bushes in our yard. The major, rather obvious problem with this is that humans cannot legitimately be owned. Person A cannot own person B legitimately. Sure, one may have a case where a slave is owned by his slaveowner, but that would be wrong. To say that slavery is wrong means that no person can own another person legitimately. Hence, the analogy fails to establish its point.
If God owns our lives in any sense, then he is evil. The same way that a slaveowner is evil. The same way that a person who created beings for the sole purpose of owning them would be evil. Only person A can legitimately "own" Person A's life. Certainly humans are not property.
So, those are the problems with the defense that since God created life, he has the right to take it away. Affirming this implies affirming the general principle that if a being creates life, then he has the right to take it away. This general principle has 2 main problems:
1. It fails to call evil a being who creates life for the sole purpose to enjoy destroying it.
2. It relies on the idea that a being can own a human. Only an evil being would attempt to own a human.
Therefore, the general principle fails to justify a God who would command the killing of infants. Norman L. Geisler, Ph.D., is wrong.
For a more thorough discussion of the killing of infants and various attempts by Christians to justify it, go here.
Saturday, December 10, 2005
Using Biblical Inerrancy to Prove God
Hello there. Today's bad argument is that used by Biblical Inerrantists. They argue that since the Bible has no errors, contradictions, etc. that it must be the written word of God. Hence, God must exist.
Circular Reasoning
The argument goes like this: "These books were written by dozens of people in different locations in different eras. Since it contains no errors or contradictions, it must be from God."
However, doesn't the Bible claim that God exists in the first place?
If the Bible has no errors and it claims that God exists, then it would follow that God exists. There need be no appeal to dozens of people in different locations who wrote the book. In order to claim that "The bible has no errors" one must assume that the statement that "God exists" is not in error. So, to use the fact that the bible has no errors to conclude that God exists is to use circular reasoning. One must presuppose God exists in order for the argument to get off the ground.
So, any argument that "the bible has no errors" to conclude that "God exists" is question-begging.
Lack of Contradiction is not so Spectacular
Even if it was proven that there were no contradictions in the Bible, would that really matter? Well maybe if they were randomly choosen books that were thrown together into one. However, they were not. The Council of Nicea in around A.D. 300 (something like that) decided what books would be in it. People figured out what books would be in it by vote. So, they probably had read them before and therefore, any large doctrinal disuptes could be taken care of. So, even if the Inerrantist were to prove that the Bible has no contradictions, that would be easy to account for given the fact that the books were chosen to be in the Bible. If they contradicted each other to a large degree, then they probably wouldn't have chosen them to be in the Bible in the first place.
Conclusion
Biblical Inerrancy is a belief that is difficult to uphold. There are many bad arguments that they use in defense of their position. I don't really care too much about this topic either. Even if there were some errors in the Bible, that wouldn't prove Christianity false. At most, it would just prove that God didn't write those parts.
Circular Reasoning
The argument goes like this: "These books were written by dozens of people in different locations in different eras. Since it contains no errors or contradictions, it must be from God."
However, doesn't the Bible claim that God exists in the first place?
If the Bible has no errors and it claims that God exists, then it would follow that God exists. There need be no appeal to dozens of people in different locations who wrote the book. In order to claim that "The bible has no errors" one must assume that the statement that "God exists" is not in error. So, to use the fact that the bible has no errors to conclude that God exists is to use circular reasoning. One must presuppose God exists in order for the argument to get off the ground.
So, any argument that "the bible has no errors" to conclude that "God exists" is question-begging.
Lack of Contradiction is not so Spectacular
Even if it was proven that there were no contradictions in the Bible, would that really matter? Well maybe if they were randomly choosen books that were thrown together into one. However, they were not. The Council of Nicea in around A.D. 300 (something like that) decided what books would be in it. People figured out what books would be in it by vote. So, they probably had read them before and therefore, any large doctrinal disuptes could be taken care of. So, even if the Inerrantist were to prove that the Bible has no contradictions, that would be easy to account for given the fact that the books were chosen to be in the Bible. If they contradicted each other to a large degree, then they probably wouldn't have chosen them to be in the Bible in the first place.
Conclusion
Biblical Inerrancy is a belief that is difficult to uphold. There are many bad arguments that they use in defense of their position. I don't really care too much about this topic either. Even if there were some errors in the Bible, that wouldn't prove Christianity false. At most, it would just prove that God didn't write those parts.
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