Many people have used the phrase in political debate that one should not legislate morality. However, this claim is false and not coherent. We will see why below.
"One should not legislate morality"
It is important to see what those who are against 'legislating morality' are claiming to be against. People who are against 'legislating morality' often point to laws that go too far and do not respect people's privacy. A law against homosexuality would be 'legislating morality' since sexual orientation, as long as it's not harming others, should be a private matter. The government should not be ignoring people's right to privacy. The argument can also be extended to many other examples.
However, one must note the presence of the clause "as long as it's not harming others." What is the justification for this clause? Also, how does one say "The government should not be ignoring people's right to privacy?"
The justification of any law must come from morality. If one shows that, without a given law, many people would be hurt only proves it is a just law if it is morally required that we care about other people's suffering. The same can be said about any other justification of a law. Adding the phrase "as long as no harm is done to others" presumes that morality demands that we care about harming others.
So, when one is talking about what the law ought to say, one has no other choice but to resort to morality. Realizing this makes the statement "The law ought not legislate morality" very puzzling since the phrase "ought" is in there. If that is a 'moral' ought then one is equivalently saying, "Morality demands that we do not legislate morality."
Clearly, something has gone wrong here. If we can't legislate morality, then what morality demands would be irrelevant. We wouldn't be able to use morality to show morality can't be legislated.
In order to legislate morality, one need not argue that since an act is wrong, it must be legislated against. There are many competing issues when determining what acts to legislate against. An act would have to be immoral but we also have to consider if, in policing the act, we are violating people's rights. One of these rights is a right to privacy. Surely, this right can be overridden if the act is terrible enough. These are things that must be weighed. Surely, no one is arguing that one should make all immoral acts illegal.
Morality provides a framework to weigh competing considerations. Without morality, you cannot weigh these considerations at all to determine what acts one should legislate against.
Conclusion
Clearly, one has to legislate morality. The phrase "One ought not legislate morality" is a confused one and is surely false. For another person expressing the same viewpoint, see Alonzo's post here.
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Saturday, February 09, 2008
Ch. 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?
Chapter 1
We have three debaters to debate this chapter. William Rowe will argue that evil is evidence against belief in God. His opponents are Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann.
William Rowe's Case
First, William Rowe makes his case that evil is evidence against God's existence. He makes it very clear at the beginning what is being argued. He isn't attempting to show that God doesn't exist or that overall, the evidence is against him. He is attempting to show that, all other grounds for belief in God aside, the consideration of the amount and intensity of suffering that exists makes God's existence less likely.
His argument structure is the following:
1. There exists horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit evil without a justifying reason for doing so.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
He does not claim to be able to establish premise (1) with certainty. His point is given the instances of horrendous evil that we see every day, it is plausible that (1) is true. He gives two instances of seemingly pointless suffering which are:
1. A fawn is horribly burned in a forest fire caused by lightning. It lies on the forest floor suffering terribly for five days before death relieves it of its suffering.
2. A five year old girl is brutally beaten, raped, and strangled in Flint, Michigan, on New Year's Day.
He states that examples such as these are plentiful and it is pretty difficult to believe that God had a good reason for allowing them to occur. It seems that whatever good we can come up with, it doesn't seem to justify God allowing the event to occur. These are examples of seemingly pointless suffering which make premise (1) seem plausible.
First Objection: Argument from Ignorance
Rowe responds to the objection that his argument from evil is an argument from ignorance. The argument goes: We are not omniscient like God is so we shouldn't expect to understand all the reasons he allows bad things to happen. It is fallacious to argue that we don't see a reason why certain bad events occur to argue that there is no such good reason. After all, a good parent may have to make his kids suffer for their good even if they can't understand why. A little kid is made to go to the dentist, for example.
Rowe responds that it may be plausible to think a finite being has a good reason for these evils to occur, it isn't plausible to think an infinite being does. Also, if God were a good parent, why doesn't he comfort us while we're going through this necessary evil? Why does he stay silent? It would be like a parent sending their kid to the dentist and not comforting them and telling them that it's for their own good. God, if he exists, has been silent on many occasions where horrendous suffering has occurred. Rowe wonders why.
He meets the argument head on on page 9 by saying that we have a reasonable judgment of the goods involved in many of these seemingly pointless instances of suffering. Therefore, we can trust our intuition and say that it is plausible they are pointless.
Second Objection: Theodicies
Rowe then considers that someone could bring up a reason why God allows such evils and if that reason worked, then that would refute his argument. However, he contends such theodicies fail. He briefly mentions and objects to the free will theodicy.
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann's Response
Snyder and Bergmann aren't interested in bringing up any theodicies to defeat Rowe's argument. Instead, they take the first objection, that Rowe's argument is an argument from ignorance. That we don't have good reason to say, one way or the other, whether an omnipotent, omniscient being would have justifying reasons to allow the given instances of suffering.
Nosseum Arguments
Snyder and Bergmann bring up the example of extraterrestrials. They imagine someone who sees no evidence for aliens to argue that they probably don't exist. To guarantee this conclusion however, the following proposition is needed:
P1. More likely than not, if aliens existed, we would find evidence for them.
However, P1 doesn't seem true. We can think of many reasons why we wouldn't see any evidence for aliens if they existed. Perhaps they live too far away or are not intelligent enough to make contact or have no desire to do so. So, it is not reasonable to accept P1.
They argue there is a similar proposition in need of proving in Rowe's argument, that being:
P1'. More likely than not, if a justifying reason for God to allow these horrendous evils existed, we would see them.
They argue that we just don't have enough knowledge to know if this statement is true. Therefore, the burden is on Rowe to show that it is.
Rowe's Response
Rowe responds to nosseum argument that he is making something more like a no-conceivum argument. Not only is it the case that we don't see goods coming from the horrendous evils, we can't imagine why a God would allow such things. This does not parallel the case of extraterrestrials because we can imagine situations where they wouldn't visit us but still exist. However, we can't imagine justifying reasons God may have.
He also criticizes them by asking how much evil would it take for it to be enough against God's existence? Even if all of our lives were characterized by constant suffering, Bergmann and Snyder seem like they would still argue that we are not in a good enough position to say whether God would allow it.
Bergmann and Snyder's Response
They respond that Rowe still hasn't given a good reason to think that if God had justifying reasons for the evils we see, that we would see them. He is arguing that we can't conceive of a reason for God to allow them which implies there probably isn't one. This takes a nosseum proposition like P1' given above and none has been defended.
Evaluation
Overall, I would say that Rowe's argument is not an argument from ignorance. I think, without a theodicy of any sort, when faced with the large amounts of evil that occur, they have to count against God's existence. I think there is a good theodicy given by Richard Swinburne in his book Providence and the Problem of Evil. However, the number of seemingly pointless instances of suffering do cry out for an explanation. It seems that in general, we are in a good position to tell whether a future event is likely to result in unnecessary suffering. We do it all the time.
Bergmann and Snyder do make an initially convincing case though. However, their case seems to go against the statement that if something seems true, that gives evidence towards it being true. They want to argue in a case similar to Stephen Wykstra. He argues that the following principle is true with regard to believing something based on appearances.
"On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would be different than it is in some way discernible to her."--(quoted from Providence and Problem of evil, p. 25)
For example, we can only say of an object that it appears to be red if we have reason to believe that if it wasn't red, it would appear in a different way and we would be able to detect it as so. However, this claim is too bold and leads to an infinite regress.
Take any ordinary claim like my computer appears to be in front of me. Using Wykstra's argument, we would only be able to claim this if I could say that if my computer weren't in front of me, then it wouldn't appear to be there. This appears fine and true, but using Wykstra's principle, this is not enough. We need reason to think that if this statement were false, we would know it. We may be able to come up with yet another reason but in the end, we would be stuck in an infinite regress trying to justify each appearance. So, it seems the general principle underlying Wykstra's and Bergmann's and Snyder's response is false. (I owe this point to Richard Swinburne which is made in his book Providence and Problem of Evil, p. 25-27)
So, in the end, I believe Rowe has made a better case, that theists have to put up a theodicy to answer his argument from evil. His argument is not an argument from ignorance. In response, someone can't rely on the general statement that we can only claim that it appears that p if we have good reason to think if p were false, we would detect it. A theist must come up with a theodicy if he is to answer Rowe's argument from evil. I do think such a theodicy exists (Swinburne's) but without one, Rowe's argument succeeds.
Go here for a good paper on nosseum arguments.
We have three debaters to debate this chapter. William Rowe will argue that evil is evidence against belief in God. His opponents are Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann.
William Rowe's Case
First, William Rowe makes his case that evil is evidence against God's existence. He makes it very clear at the beginning what is being argued. He isn't attempting to show that God doesn't exist or that overall, the evidence is against him. He is attempting to show that, all other grounds for belief in God aside, the consideration of the amount and intensity of suffering that exists makes God's existence less likely.
His argument structure is the following:
1. There exists horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit evil without a justifying reason for doing so.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
He does not claim to be able to establish premise (1) with certainty. His point is given the instances of horrendous evil that we see every day, it is plausible that (1) is true. He gives two instances of seemingly pointless suffering which are:
1. A fawn is horribly burned in a forest fire caused by lightning. It lies on the forest floor suffering terribly for five days before death relieves it of its suffering.
2. A five year old girl is brutally beaten, raped, and strangled in Flint, Michigan, on New Year's Day.
He states that examples such as these are plentiful and it is pretty difficult to believe that God had a good reason for allowing them to occur. It seems that whatever good we can come up with, it doesn't seem to justify God allowing the event to occur. These are examples of seemingly pointless suffering which make premise (1) seem plausible.
First Objection: Argument from Ignorance
Rowe responds to the objection that his argument from evil is an argument from ignorance. The argument goes: We are not omniscient like God is so we shouldn't expect to understand all the reasons he allows bad things to happen. It is fallacious to argue that we don't see a reason why certain bad events occur to argue that there is no such good reason. After all, a good parent may have to make his kids suffer for their good even if they can't understand why. A little kid is made to go to the dentist, for example.
Rowe responds that it may be plausible to think a finite being has a good reason for these evils to occur, it isn't plausible to think an infinite being does. Also, if God were a good parent, why doesn't he comfort us while we're going through this necessary evil? Why does he stay silent? It would be like a parent sending their kid to the dentist and not comforting them and telling them that it's for their own good. God, if he exists, has been silent on many occasions where horrendous suffering has occurred. Rowe wonders why.
He meets the argument head on on page 9 by saying that we have a reasonable judgment of the goods involved in many of these seemingly pointless instances of suffering. Therefore, we can trust our intuition and say that it is plausible they are pointless.
Second Objection: Theodicies
Rowe then considers that someone could bring up a reason why God allows such evils and if that reason worked, then that would refute his argument. However, he contends such theodicies fail. He briefly mentions and objects to the free will theodicy.
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann's Response
Snyder and Bergmann aren't interested in bringing up any theodicies to defeat Rowe's argument. Instead, they take the first objection, that Rowe's argument is an argument from ignorance. That we don't have good reason to say, one way or the other, whether an omnipotent, omniscient being would have justifying reasons to allow the given instances of suffering.
Nosseum Arguments
Snyder and Bergmann bring up the example of extraterrestrials. They imagine someone who sees no evidence for aliens to argue that they probably don't exist. To guarantee this conclusion however, the following proposition is needed:
P1. More likely than not, if aliens existed, we would find evidence for them.
However, P1 doesn't seem true. We can think of many reasons why we wouldn't see any evidence for aliens if they existed. Perhaps they live too far away or are not intelligent enough to make contact or have no desire to do so. So, it is not reasonable to accept P1.
They argue there is a similar proposition in need of proving in Rowe's argument, that being:
P1'. More likely than not, if a justifying reason for God to allow these horrendous evils existed, we would see them.
They argue that we just don't have enough knowledge to know if this statement is true. Therefore, the burden is on Rowe to show that it is.
Rowe's Response
Rowe responds to nosseum argument that he is making something more like a no-conceivum argument. Not only is it the case that we don't see goods coming from the horrendous evils, we can't imagine why a God would allow such things. This does not parallel the case of extraterrestrials because we can imagine situations where they wouldn't visit us but still exist. However, we can't imagine justifying reasons God may have.
He also criticizes them by asking how much evil would it take for it to be enough against God's existence? Even if all of our lives were characterized by constant suffering, Bergmann and Snyder seem like they would still argue that we are not in a good enough position to say whether God would allow it.
Bergmann and Snyder's Response
They respond that Rowe still hasn't given a good reason to think that if God had justifying reasons for the evils we see, that we would see them. He is arguing that we can't conceive of a reason for God to allow them which implies there probably isn't one. This takes a nosseum proposition like P1' given above and none has been defended.
Evaluation
Overall, I would say that Rowe's argument is not an argument from ignorance. I think, without a theodicy of any sort, when faced with the large amounts of evil that occur, they have to count against God's existence. I think there is a good theodicy given by Richard Swinburne in his book Providence and the Problem of Evil. However, the number of seemingly pointless instances of suffering do cry out for an explanation. It seems that in general, we are in a good position to tell whether a future event is likely to result in unnecessary suffering. We do it all the time.
Bergmann and Snyder do make an initially convincing case though. However, their case seems to go against the statement that if something seems true, that gives evidence towards it being true. They want to argue in a case similar to Stephen Wykstra. He argues that the following principle is true with regard to believing something based on appearances.
"On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would be different than it is in some way discernible to her."--(quoted from Providence and Problem of evil, p. 25)
For example, we can only say of an object that it appears to be red if we have reason to believe that if it wasn't red, it would appear in a different way and we would be able to detect it as so. However, this claim is too bold and leads to an infinite regress.
Take any ordinary claim like my computer appears to be in front of me. Using Wykstra's argument, we would only be able to claim this if I could say that if my computer weren't in front of me, then it wouldn't appear to be there. This appears fine and true, but using Wykstra's principle, this is not enough. We need reason to think that if this statement were false, we would know it. We may be able to come up with yet another reason but in the end, we would be stuck in an infinite regress trying to justify each appearance. So, it seems the general principle underlying Wykstra's and Bergmann's and Snyder's response is false. (I owe this point to Richard Swinburne which is made in his book Providence and Problem of Evil, p. 25-27)
So, in the end, I believe Rowe has made a better case, that theists have to put up a theodicy to answer his argument from evil. His argument is not an argument from ignorance. In response, someone can't rely on the general statement that we can only claim that it appears that p if we have good reason to think if p were false, we would detect it. A theist must come up with a theodicy if he is to answer Rowe's argument from evil. I do think such a theodicy exists (Swinburne's) but without one, Rowe's argument succeeds.
Go here for a good paper on nosseum arguments.
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion
Hello there,
I recently checked out Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. It has many different contributors. I'd like to start a series where I review a debate in here every week. There are 12 total. When I do them, I will create links on this page so they can all be found in one spot.
Chapter 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?
I recently checked out Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. It has many different contributors. I'd like to start a series where I review a debate in here every week. There are 12 total. When I do them, I will create links on this page so they can all be found in one spot.
Chapter 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?
Connecticut Valley Atheists: Imagine No Religion
Hello,
The Connecticut Valley Atheists have posted a sign that has a picture of the twin towers standing with the statement: Imagine No Religion. This is a bigoted sign and should be treated with discontempt. It is just as bigoted to look at all the wrong done by Joseph Stalin and post a picture of it and say: Imagine No Religion. Joseph Stalin was an atheist but clearly not all atheists are bad like Joseph Stalin. The people who ran airplanes into the World Trade Center were religious but clearly not all religious people are prone to these acts of violence.
A religion caused 9/11. That is very different from saying all religions cause extreme acts of violence. Sure, the world would be a better place if there weren't any Islamic fanatics running airplanes into buildings. That doesn't mean that the world would be better if there were no religion at all. That statement takes a lot more evidence. (Note, I am not saying anything about Muslims in general, just the fanatical ones who caused 9/11.)
A post I made earlier echoes similar comments and gives a more thorough treatment of the atheists who wish to blame religion for the wrongdoing of the religious. It also criticizes theists who wish to blame atheism for the wrongdoing of atheists.
Here is a post by Alonzo Fyfe who is an atheist against the sign posted by the Connecticut Valley Atheists.
Please remember it is not religion or atheism that causes these things, it is people's blindness to the truth. It is their exceedingly strong desire to believe a certain act is good that makes them ignore all the evidence to the contrary.
From a comment made by Alonzo on his blog, he writes:
"Think of a sign that says, "Imagine: No Arabs." We can defend such a sign the same way people are trying to defend the "Imagine: No Religion"sign. Yes, it is possible that some non-Arab might have some day attacked the towers. However, if we had a world without arabs, chances are, the towers would still be standing.
Does this justify the sentiment, "Imagine: No Arabs?"
No . . . because it blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.
Similarly, "Imagine: No Religion" blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.
Both versions are morally repulsive and for the same reasons."
See this post for more defense by Alonzo.
The Connecticut Valley Atheists have posted a sign that has a picture of the twin towers standing with the statement: Imagine No Religion. This is a bigoted sign and should be treated with discontempt. It is just as bigoted to look at all the wrong done by Joseph Stalin and post a picture of it and say: Imagine No Religion. Joseph Stalin was an atheist but clearly not all atheists are bad like Joseph Stalin. The people who ran airplanes into the World Trade Center were religious but clearly not all religious people are prone to these acts of violence.
A religion caused 9/11. That is very different from saying all religions cause extreme acts of violence. Sure, the world would be a better place if there weren't any Islamic fanatics running airplanes into buildings. That doesn't mean that the world would be better if there were no religion at all. That statement takes a lot more evidence. (Note, I am not saying anything about Muslims in general, just the fanatical ones who caused 9/11.)
A post I made earlier echoes similar comments and gives a more thorough treatment of the atheists who wish to blame religion for the wrongdoing of the religious. It also criticizes theists who wish to blame atheism for the wrongdoing of atheists.
Here is a post by Alonzo Fyfe who is an atheist against the sign posted by the Connecticut Valley Atheists.
Please remember it is not religion or atheism that causes these things, it is people's blindness to the truth. It is their exceedingly strong desire to believe a certain act is good that makes them ignore all the evidence to the contrary.
From a comment made by Alonzo on his blog, he writes:
"Think of a sign that says, "Imagine: No Arabs." We can defend such a sign the same way people are trying to defend the "Imagine: No Religion"sign. Yes, it is possible that some non-Arab might have some day attacked the towers. However, if we had a world without arabs, chances are, the towers would still be standing.
Does this justify the sentiment, "Imagine: No Arabs?"
No . . . because it blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.
Similarly, "Imagine: No Religion" blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.
Both versions are morally repulsive and for the same reasons."
See this post for more defense by Alonzo.
Monday, April 23, 2007
The Moral Argument for God
Please, I beg of you.
Don't use the moral argument for God to argue for God's existence. One may ask, "Hmm, moral argument for God? What is that all about?"
Well I'll tell you. Moral laws exist. Moral laws couldn't exist without a law maker. Therefore, there must be a lawmaker that exists and creates these laws. Humans can't be the creators of these laws because the moral laws transcend human laws. Sometimes, humans can be mistaken with regard to which laws are right or wrong. If God doesn't exist, humans are the only beings left who will make the laws. If one disagrees with a law made by humans, they have no higher standard to appeal to. So, they can't object to the human laws at all. So, if God doesn't exist, human laws are the top of the line, they are all we have. But clearly, moral relativism, the view that if a majority of humans agree on a law, then it's real is wrong. So is subjectivism, the view that morality is nothing more than a personal preference, nothing more than preferring turkey over ham on your sandwich. If God doesn't exist, it is either the individual or the society one lives in that gets to make the rules. Since this is false, there are rules outside of these systems, God must exist.
So, that's the argument. Where does it go wrong?
1. God can't make up any laws he wants and still be a good being. If God made up the law, "Everyone rape as much as possible" then that wouldn't make the law good, that would make God bad. So, it seems the laws must even transcend any God that may exist. Therefore, the "moral laws" cannot rely on any being.
2. What does it mean to say that God's laws are "better" or constitute a "higher standard" than human laws? One may saw that God is all-good, so his laws must be better. However, what does "all-good" mean? It must mean something other than "whatever God's laws dictate" otherwise, if God commanded rape, rape would become good. One must use a standard of good apart from God to state meaningfully that God is all-good. One may say that God is omniscient so in that way, his standard is better or higher. However, God merely exists as a signpost for morality, he is not then the creator of morality. So, this response fails to establish the argument. One may say that God is all-powerful, so his standard is better. However, the amount of power you have doesn't affect how good your laws are. What matters is that they allign with what is good, not that you have the power to enforce them.
With these two fundamental problems, one may wonder who uses this argument? Many people. One example is from the book titled I Don't Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist. In chapter 7, the writers defend this argument as sound. They spend pretty much the entire chapter proving that the moral law exists. They however spend no time at all linking the premise "the moral law exists" to the conclusion that "God exists." They surely don't respond to the Euthyphro Dilemma which is a 2,000 year old response to this argument and is basically a reformulation of point #1.
Here is another example of someone using the argument.
The writer defines something as moral if it adheres to a standard given by a legitimate authority. However, this runs into the same problems mentioned. What makes an authority legitimate? Because it's commands are good? And why are they good? And so on.
Here is his supposed solution to the Euthyphro dilemma.
"The Solution
The general strategy used to defeat a dilemma is to show that it's a false one. There are not two options, but three.
The Christian rejects the first option, that morality is an arbitrary function of God's power. And he rejects the second option, that God is responsible to a higher law. There is no Law over God.
The third option is that an objective standard exists (this avoids the first horn of the dilemma). However, the standard is not external to God, but internal (avoiding the second horn). Morality is grounded in the immutable character of God, who is perfectly good. His commands are not whims, but rooted in His holiness.
Could God simply decree that torturing babies was moral? "No," the Christian answers, "God would never do that." It's not a matter of command. It's a matter of character.""
However, if something is good because it agrees with God's character, we still have the same problem. If God's character were different, if God's character was such that he liked rape and as a result commanded it, then God would be evil. That wouldn't make rape good. Also, it isn't explained what it means for God's character to be "good." Does it mean that God's character is God's?
Also a related subject, some theists argue that if morality doesn't depend on God, then God must somehow be less powerful as a result. However, I find this to be a mirror image of a similar objection. Some people argue the same result would follow if logic doesn't depend on God. If God can't make false the law of noncontradiction, then God must be bounded by the rules of logic. So, this makes God trapped and forced to obey the rules of logic.
This idea is silly. What would it mean for God to make something exist and not exist at the same time? Is God any less powerful for not being able to do this? What would it mean for God to disobey the rules of logic? Or change them?
I think a similar consideration applies to God's inability to make rape good. Given certain facts about humans, it follows necessarily that rape is wrong. Much in the same way that it's necessarily false that something exists and doesn't exist at the same time. Given the fact that people don't like rape, it scars its victims for life, and so on, that necessarily makes rape wrong.
God can't make it so that the same things are true of rape that are true of it now, but make rape right. God can't hold the amount of pain and agony rape causes constant, but change how he feels about it and it would magically become right. This is because these facts cause rape to be wrong (obviously).
So basically, what people who argue in this fashion are saying is the following: God would be more powerful if he could hold all the facts about how much rape hurts its victims but magically change the moral status of rape. This claim, I argue, makes as much sense as saying God would be more powerful if he could create a square circle or a 10-sided triangle. It is logically impossible to do so, so it doesn't make any sense to say that a being can do it.
So, I don't think it handicaps Christianity or any other theistic belief to say that morality doesn't depend on God. Sure, morality may depend on God in an indirect manner. He created us with certain psychological mechanisms which causes us to hate being raped. Then, rape is wrong. He could have created us so that we didn't care about being raped, so in that sense, he causes rape to be wrong. However, this isn't the same as saying that God could have created us with the same psychological facts but instead made rape right. This is what those who say morality depends on God are saying (in some shape or form). It should be fairly obvious that they are wrong.
Don't use the moral argument for God to argue for God's existence. One may ask, "Hmm, moral argument for God? What is that all about?"
Well I'll tell you. Moral laws exist. Moral laws couldn't exist without a law maker. Therefore, there must be a lawmaker that exists and creates these laws. Humans can't be the creators of these laws because the moral laws transcend human laws. Sometimes, humans can be mistaken with regard to which laws are right or wrong. If God doesn't exist, humans are the only beings left who will make the laws. If one disagrees with a law made by humans, they have no higher standard to appeal to. So, they can't object to the human laws at all. So, if God doesn't exist, human laws are the top of the line, they are all we have. But clearly, moral relativism, the view that if a majority of humans agree on a law, then it's real is wrong. So is subjectivism, the view that morality is nothing more than a personal preference, nothing more than preferring turkey over ham on your sandwich. If God doesn't exist, it is either the individual or the society one lives in that gets to make the rules. Since this is false, there are rules outside of these systems, God must exist.
So, that's the argument. Where does it go wrong?
1. God can't make up any laws he wants and still be a good being. If God made up the law, "Everyone rape as much as possible" then that wouldn't make the law good, that would make God bad. So, it seems the laws must even transcend any God that may exist. Therefore, the "moral laws" cannot rely on any being.
2. What does it mean to say that God's laws are "better" or constitute a "higher standard" than human laws? One may saw that God is all-good, so his laws must be better. However, what does "all-good" mean? It must mean something other than "whatever God's laws dictate" otherwise, if God commanded rape, rape would become good. One must use a standard of good apart from God to state meaningfully that God is all-good. One may say that God is omniscient so in that way, his standard is better or higher. However, God merely exists as a signpost for morality, he is not then the creator of morality. So, this response fails to establish the argument. One may say that God is all-powerful, so his standard is better. However, the amount of power you have doesn't affect how good your laws are. What matters is that they allign with what is good, not that you have the power to enforce them.
With these two fundamental problems, one may wonder who uses this argument? Many people. One example is from the book titled I Don't Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist. In chapter 7, the writers defend this argument as sound. They spend pretty much the entire chapter proving that the moral law exists. They however spend no time at all linking the premise "the moral law exists" to the conclusion that "God exists." They surely don't respond to the Euthyphro Dilemma which is a 2,000 year old response to this argument and is basically a reformulation of point #1.
Here is another example of someone using the argument.
The writer defines something as moral if it adheres to a standard given by a legitimate authority. However, this runs into the same problems mentioned. What makes an authority legitimate? Because it's commands are good? And why are they good? And so on.
Here is his supposed solution to the Euthyphro dilemma.
"The Solution
The general strategy used to defeat a dilemma is to show that it's a false one. There are not two options, but three.
The Christian rejects the first option, that morality is an arbitrary function of God's power. And he rejects the second option, that God is responsible to a higher law. There is no Law over God.
The third option is that an objective standard exists (this avoids the first horn of the dilemma). However, the standard is not external to God, but internal (avoiding the second horn). Morality is grounded in the immutable character of God, who is perfectly good. His commands are not whims, but rooted in His holiness.
Could God simply decree that torturing babies was moral? "No," the Christian answers, "God would never do that." It's not a matter of command. It's a matter of character.""
However, if something is good because it agrees with God's character, we still have the same problem. If God's character were different, if God's character was such that he liked rape and as a result commanded it, then God would be evil. That wouldn't make rape good. Also, it isn't explained what it means for God's character to be "good." Does it mean that God's character is God's?
Also a related subject, some theists argue that if morality doesn't depend on God, then God must somehow be less powerful as a result. However, I find this to be a mirror image of a similar objection. Some people argue the same result would follow if logic doesn't depend on God. If God can't make false the law of noncontradiction, then God must be bounded by the rules of logic. So, this makes God trapped and forced to obey the rules of logic.
This idea is silly. What would it mean for God to make something exist and not exist at the same time? Is God any less powerful for not being able to do this? What would it mean for God to disobey the rules of logic? Or change them?
I think a similar consideration applies to God's inability to make rape good. Given certain facts about humans, it follows necessarily that rape is wrong. Much in the same way that it's necessarily false that something exists and doesn't exist at the same time. Given the fact that people don't like rape, it scars its victims for life, and so on, that necessarily makes rape wrong.
God can't make it so that the same things are true of rape that are true of it now, but make rape right. God can't hold the amount of pain and agony rape causes constant, but change how he feels about it and it would magically become right. This is because these facts cause rape to be wrong (obviously).
So basically, what people who argue in this fashion are saying is the following: God would be more powerful if he could hold all the facts about how much rape hurts its victims but magically change the moral status of rape. This claim, I argue, makes as much sense as saying God would be more powerful if he could create a square circle or a 10-sided triangle. It is logically impossible to do so, so it doesn't make any sense to say that a being can do it.
So, I don't think it handicaps Christianity or any other theistic belief to say that morality doesn't depend on God. Sure, morality may depend on God in an indirect manner. He created us with certain psychological mechanisms which causes us to hate being raped. Then, rape is wrong. He could have created us so that we didn't care about being raped, so in that sense, he causes rape to be wrong. However, this isn't the same as saying that God could have created us with the same psychological facts but instead made rape right. This is what those who say morality depends on God are saying (in some shape or form). It should be fairly obvious that they are wrong.
The IPCC on Global Warming
The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is made up of 2500 scientists from around the world who work to look at the evidence of global warming and assess its impact on the world. They just put out a new report and its is very frightening. Here is some things they say:
"The IPCC concludes that global warming has almost certainly triggered changes in the Earth's ecosystem that have already been felt in increased drought, shrinking glaciers and changing seasons, and these effects are expected to intensify. Freshwater stored in glaciers and snow cover will be lost, while rainfall will increasingly come in destructive deluges, reducing the water supply to one-sixth of the humanity — with the teeming masses dependent on the melt water from the Himalayas particularly hard hit. Some 20-30% of plant and animal species are at risk of extinction if global temperatures rise in line with median projections, while by 2080, many millions of people living along coastlines will face an annual flood risk.
The IPCC expects climate change to bring "increased deaths, disease and injury due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts," with most of the pain being borne by the poor, tropical countries already on the edge of environmental disaster. In Africa by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are expected to suffer from increased water shortages resulting from climate change, and attempting to adapt could consume as much as 10% of the GDP of African nations. In poorly nourished Central and South Asia, crop yields could decrease 30% by 2050. "The poorest of the poor are going to be the worst hit," said IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri. "People who are poor are least able to adapt to climate change."
The IPCC has also concluded that it human activity is most likely the "chief driver" of global warming. However, these things can fail to occur if we act now to prevent it. Now is a crucial time. So, what do the politicians of China, US, and Russia do about it?
"The IPCC had concluded in February that greenhouse gas emissions from human activity were "very likely" the chief driver of global warming, and Friday's report dealt with its human and ecological impact. But clashes between scientists and political officials over its wording almost prevented the report from being published on schedule. Countries such as China, Russia and the U.S. reportedly pushed to water down the IPCC's predictions, while the scientists whose work formed the backbone of the report fought back in an all-night session preceding Friday's release."
From the Time article here.
"The IPCC concludes that global warming has almost certainly triggered changes in the Earth's ecosystem that have already been felt in increased drought, shrinking glaciers and changing seasons, and these effects are expected to intensify. Freshwater stored in glaciers and snow cover will be lost, while rainfall will increasingly come in destructive deluges, reducing the water supply to one-sixth of the humanity — with the teeming masses dependent on the melt water from the Himalayas particularly hard hit. Some 20-30% of plant and animal species are at risk of extinction if global temperatures rise in line with median projections, while by 2080, many millions of people living along coastlines will face an annual flood risk.
The IPCC expects climate change to bring "increased deaths, disease and injury due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts," with most of the pain being borne by the poor, tropical countries already on the edge of environmental disaster. In Africa by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are expected to suffer from increased water shortages resulting from climate change, and attempting to adapt could consume as much as 10% of the GDP of African nations. In poorly nourished Central and South Asia, crop yields could decrease 30% by 2050. "The poorest of the poor are going to be the worst hit," said IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri. "People who are poor are least able to adapt to climate change."
The IPCC has also concluded that it human activity is most likely the "chief driver" of global warming. However, these things can fail to occur if we act now to prevent it. Now is a crucial time. So, what do the politicians of China, US, and Russia do about it?
"The IPCC had concluded in February that greenhouse gas emissions from human activity were "very likely" the chief driver of global warming, and Friday's report dealt with its human and ecological impact. But clashes between scientists and political officials over its wording almost prevented the report from being published on schedule. Countries such as China, Russia and the U.S. reportedly pushed to water down the IPCC's predictions, while the scientists whose work formed the backbone of the report fought back in an all-night session preceding Friday's release."
From the Time article here.
A Perspective on the Pledge by Alonzo Fyfe
An interesting parody of the people who often argue "the pledge of allegiance says 'one nation under God' in it to reflect our heritage. Therefore, it should stay there."
From here.
From here.
"Okay," said Shawn. "Then, 50 years ago, Congress added the word white to the Pledge of Allegiance. We are supposed to be one white nation, indivisible. When we pledge allegiance to one white nation, doesn't this mean that not being white is as bad as being in favor of rebellion or tyranny or injustice?"
"No," Shelby said with a sigh of relief. "No, not at all. Congress added that to reflect our heritage. It simply pays respect to the fact that all of our founding fathers were white, and that they clearly wanted to establish a white nation, and the fact that all of our past Presidents have been white."
16 Questions for Atheists
My friend James Lazarus has posted his answers to 16 questions for atheists originally posted by some Christians. Here is a link to his response to the 16 questions. I will provide my own.
1. Why is there something rather than nothing?
This question is ambiguous. First, it may mean, "Why does anything exist at all?" If it means that, then I think the theist and nontheist alike is plagued by the same question. Why does God exist rather than not? Some theists have argued God is a logically necessary being via the Ontological Argument. In that argument, it is attempted to show that God must exist due to logical necessity. However, I don't think the Ontological Argument works since it is possible to imagine a universe without a God existing. Therefore, I don't think it can be shown that God is logically necessary in the same way that "2 + 2 =4" is. Given this, theists also have to wrestle with the question of why there is a God rather than not.
The statement may also mean, "Why does the universe exist?" The theists will answer that the universe exists because God created it. The nontheist cannot use a similar answer of course. However, why think there needs to be an answer? One can just ask the theist where God came from and given the failure of the Ontological argument above, they wouldn't have an answer. God's existence would go unexplained. Either side has to posit a brute, unexplained fact. The theist posits God and the atheist posits the universe. Why prefer one over the other?
One can decide between the two in terms of simplicity and explanatory power. If it can be shown that God is the simpler hypothesis and has more explanatory power than the brute fact of the universe, then God would be shown to exist. This needs to be shown first before asking this question, however.
2. How do you know that you exist (without being circular)?
I'm not all that sure what relevance this has to theism. I don't think we can have an answer to this that isn't circular. I take it as a basic belief without evidence that I exist. I think it is also possible to "know" some things that are basic. I'm not exactly sure how this works though since usually, knowledge is in need of justification and basic beliefs are by definition not based on any other beliefs.
3. Where does human self-consciousness come from?
I don't know. I haven't researched the subject much. I'd say the current research on the brain can explain a lot about ourselves but I'm not sure it can explain it all. I also think atheism is consistent with mind-body dualism though I don't know how one would explain where the mind came from.
4. How do you know your senses are reliable (without being circular)?
I don't think one can answer this in a non-circular fashion. A theist would say that her senses are reliable because God made them and He would make them reliable. However, one can then ask how one knows God is concerned with truth or how one knows God is morally perfect? One must then appeal to their "sense" of truth or some type of argument which, even if not evidential, will have to rely on some type of reasoning which would be carried out by the person's mind. One can then ask why they rely on their reasoning faculty.
The atheist is in the same boat. We have a better chance of survival if we have true beliefs and reliable methods of obtaining those beliefs. Evolution then would be likely to give us some reliable faculties which we can use. We can then improve on these faculties throughout our lives through training and make them even more reliable. This is why I trust my senses and in general, my reasoning abilities. If this is circular, then so is any theist response.
5. What is truth?
A proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. It is false if it doesn't.
6. What is the cause of everything?
Well, I take this to mean, "What is the cause of the universe?" and my answer would be similar to the answer to #1.
7. What is the purpose of mankind?
Well, an atheist wouldn't believe mankind has any divine purpose. However, that doesn't mean there is no right or wrong thing to do. What is right or wrong need not be defined in terms of how our creator planned us to live. In fact, it only could be if the creator was good. If the creator were evil and gave us the purpose of causing as much suffering as possible, that wouldn't make us obliged to follow it. At that point, we would be obligated to go against our given purpose. So, even if there is no purpose of mankind, that doesn't mean there is no morality.
8. How do we determine right from wrong? Is there such a standard? Where does it come from? The State? DNA?
Some people look at their religious text to determine right from wrong. If these religious texts are false, then that is not a reliable standard. In determining if the standard is reliable, one must make sure that in relying on the standard, one isn't positing imaginary entities that don't exist in the real world. If one's standard relies on a nonexistent God, then it is not a good standard. If one's standard relies on the claim that "Whatever my state says is morally correct" or if it says "Whatever my DNA has programmed me to believe about morality" is morally correct, then these are not good standards.
I'd say that a reliable standard is a consequentialist one. Not in the sense of, judge the act by its consequences, but to judge a desire by its consequences. For the long, extended explanation, see Alonzo Fyfe here.
9. What is the difference, from an atheistic standpoint, between love and hate? Aren't these merely emotional responses triggered by certain stimuli? Why is one better than the other?
These are emotional responses triggered by stimuli but that doesn't remove the possibility of people being morally responsible for them. These emotional responses are produced by our beliefs and desires. How someone reacts to say someone calling them a bad name reflects their character. Different people with different characters will react differently. Therefore, one can blame someone for their reactions to stimuli.
Love is better than the other because it is conducive to desire fulfillment whereas hate is generally not. Hate is by definition desire-thwarting so this makes it a desire we shouldn't promote in others, that is if we are concerned for our own well-being and that of others. So, love is better than hate for this reason.
10. How do you explain transcendent truth? i.e. Even folks that have never heard of the Bible (like tribe people in deep jungles) knowing that stealing, murder, adultery, etc. is wrong?
I think this one is fairly easy. I would take out murder since murder is immoral by definition. It's like asking, "How did you know the blue ball was blue?" Well, it's a blue ball so it must be blue, duh!
As for the rest, I would say that figuring out that the desire to steal is not conducive to desire fulfillment overall is pretty obvious. I don't think we need complex scientific theories to see this is true. The same can be said of committing adultery and the general act of being dishonest. Surely, society functions much better when people have a desire to tell people the truth and to not steal from others.
11. Isn't implicit, weak or negative atheism (ala George Smith, David Eller & Michael Martin) just another form of agnosticism? If the atheist critiques theism without justification, then isn't he/she believing in atheism with something other than rational thought? And as soon as the atheist provides any kind of rational justification for his/her critique of theism, hasn't he/she just moved into explicit, strong or positive atheism? And if so, doesn't he/she then need to worry about some burden of proof for his/her belief in a lack of belief?
One could define lack of belief in a God as a form of agnosticism. Definitions don't matter much to me. See my earlier post. I don't know what it means to "critique theism without justification" so I can't answer the second question. I think critiquing theism would be equivalent to giving evidence for positive atheism only if "atheism" is defined as the "disbelief in the God being critiqued." I don't think one can argue from "God as you define it has problems, therefore all definitions of 'god' will have problems." I don't understand the last question since positive atheism is a disbelief, not just a lack of belief.
12. If you honestly do not believe there is a God, why do you ask so many questions about a God you don't believe exists?
I'd say there's many reasons. The first is that religious people use their religious text to justify harm done to others. At this point, it is important to research whether using the given religious text is the right thing to do. Is it reliable? Are the other claims it makes true? To answer these questions, one needs to know certain things about the ancient world, God, and so on. A second reason is that so many people believe in some form of a god that atheists want to know why. A third reason is that if there is a God in the traditional sense, then it would be very important morally. To find out that a morally perfect being created you and gave you the gift of life, that would make it super-wrong to do wrong acts. Also, since we owe a being who created us something, we would owe God obedience (to a certain extent). Of course, there is a limit to how much God can ask of us much the same way there is a limit to how much anyone can ask of us when a favor is done. See my answer to #7 above. If our creator asked us to rape as much as possible, then even though we owe our creator certain things, we don't owe it to him to obey that command. So, I think God's existence would have some bearing on morality and he would be a source of morality. See my earlier post.
13. If you really don't believe God exists what does it matter to you, how He should choose to punish those who don't believe?
I think it matters because people often use their belief in this matter to justify harming others. Some people who believe that homosexuals go to hell use this fact to justify beating them up and calling them names. They justify these things by saying that if it'll help even one person change their ways, it was worth it since hell is such a bad place.
I don't think belief is a morally cupable action that one can be blamed for. So, a morally good person wouldn't punish someone just for their belief. He would only punish people insofar as their beliefs indicate the presence of bad desires. I think it is important for wrongdoers to atone for their wrongdoing. It is important to "make it up" to the person you wronged. I don't think there is any good reason why God would draw the line at death as the last chance to atone for our sins. I think good people who don't end up atoning for their sins before they die should go to a limbo-type place where they can find out the truth and see if they want to atone for their sins. If they don't want to, I think they should either be allowed to continue to exist in a place other than limbo or heaven or possibly if they no longer want to exist, then God would terminate their existence.
14. If you really believe God doesn't exist, then there is no worry of punishment for you anyway, so why get upset just because someone else believes you're going to a place they believe exists?
I don't get upset because someone has different beliefs about the afterlife than me. I may want to show their view to be false or indefensible, but I don't get upset about their view. And the reason why atheists tend to get upset is because the religious people, believing atheists will go to hell and never return, try many immoral things to get atheists to become of their religion. That is something to be upset about.
15. How about "life from no life?"
I don't really see what the trouble is in believing this. I don't think life is so fundamentally different from non-living things that perhaps non-living things would eventually bring about life. People who are alive are made up of the same elements as the things that aren't alive. Diamond is a form of carbon. I think one needs to give a good explanation of how life came about, yes but I don't think the fact that scientists don't have one means we should automatically jump to "God did it." Theists have made this mistake in the past and have been wrong, things like "God makes the planets revolve around the sun."
Most biologists agree that it's possible and I don't see any reason to think they are wrong. It's just an area where science hasn't given us a definite answer yet, but that doesn't mean there isn't one forthcoming. However, there are many plausible stories, none of which has any definite evidence over the other, but they are still plausible nonetheless.
16. How can atheists speak definitively, authoritatively, or otherwise on the metaphysical (and spiritual)which is beyond their experience?
Many theists don't have the relevant experience they would need to say other religions are false. They never studied the Kabballah, Hindu religious texts, or the Koran. They never went to other churches and prayed to their god(s) and worshipped them in the way the leaders told them to worship. So, how can they say the other religions are false?
I think reason can play a part here. If they have some argument or some type of personal experience, they may reason from that to say that other religions are false. The same can be said of atheists though they don't necessarily have a personal experience, they just have arguments. But surely, one is only better than the other because one is more certain than the other. It's not that one needs to have both to be justified in their take on religion.
For example, if someone believed in leprachauns, you would be justified in not giving their claim very much weight. If they responded with, "Well you're no expert on leprachuan-searching, how would you know they don't exist?" one can easily see the absurdity of asking the question. So, one can respond to metaphysical questions which is beyond their experience if they think the object is impossible or improbable to exist. The same goes for everyone.
1. Why is there something rather than nothing?
This question is ambiguous. First, it may mean, "Why does anything exist at all?" If it means that, then I think the theist and nontheist alike is plagued by the same question. Why does God exist rather than not? Some theists have argued God is a logically necessary being via the Ontological Argument. In that argument, it is attempted to show that God must exist due to logical necessity. However, I don't think the Ontological Argument works since it is possible to imagine a universe without a God existing. Therefore, I don't think it can be shown that God is logically necessary in the same way that "2 + 2 =4" is. Given this, theists also have to wrestle with the question of why there is a God rather than not.
The statement may also mean, "Why does the universe exist?" The theists will answer that the universe exists because God created it. The nontheist cannot use a similar answer of course. However, why think there needs to be an answer? One can just ask the theist where God came from and given the failure of the Ontological argument above, they wouldn't have an answer. God's existence would go unexplained. Either side has to posit a brute, unexplained fact. The theist posits God and the atheist posits the universe. Why prefer one over the other?
One can decide between the two in terms of simplicity and explanatory power. If it can be shown that God is the simpler hypothesis and has more explanatory power than the brute fact of the universe, then God would be shown to exist. This needs to be shown first before asking this question, however.
2. How do you know that you exist (without being circular)?
I'm not all that sure what relevance this has to theism. I don't think we can have an answer to this that isn't circular. I take it as a basic belief without evidence that I exist. I think it is also possible to "know" some things that are basic. I'm not exactly sure how this works though since usually, knowledge is in need of justification and basic beliefs are by definition not based on any other beliefs.
3. Where does human self-consciousness come from?
I don't know. I haven't researched the subject much. I'd say the current research on the brain can explain a lot about ourselves but I'm not sure it can explain it all. I also think atheism is consistent with mind-body dualism though I don't know how one would explain where the mind came from.
4. How do you know your senses are reliable (without being circular)?
I don't think one can answer this in a non-circular fashion. A theist would say that her senses are reliable because God made them and He would make them reliable. However, one can then ask how one knows God is concerned with truth or how one knows God is morally perfect? One must then appeal to their "sense" of truth or some type of argument which, even if not evidential, will have to rely on some type of reasoning which would be carried out by the person's mind. One can then ask why they rely on their reasoning faculty.
The atheist is in the same boat. We have a better chance of survival if we have true beliefs and reliable methods of obtaining those beliefs. Evolution then would be likely to give us some reliable faculties which we can use. We can then improve on these faculties throughout our lives through training and make them even more reliable. This is why I trust my senses and in general, my reasoning abilities. If this is circular, then so is any theist response.
5. What is truth?
A proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. It is false if it doesn't.
6. What is the cause of everything?
Well, I take this to mean, "What is the cause of the universe?" and my answer would be similar to the answer to #1.
7. What is the purpose of mankind?
Well, an atheist wouldn't believe mankind has any divine purpose. However, that doesn't mean there is no right or wrong thing to do. What is right or wrong need not be defined in terms of how our creator planned us to live. In fact, it only could be if the creator was good. If the creator were evil and gave us the purpose of causing as much suffering as possible, that wouldn't make us obliged to follow it. At that point, we would be obligated to go against our given purpose. So, even if there is no purpose of mankind, that doesn't mean there is no morality.
8. How do we determine right from wrong? Is there such a standard? Where does it come from? The State? DNA?
Some people look at their religious text to determine right from wrong. If these religious texts are false, then that is not a reliable standard. In determining if the standard is reliable, one must make sure that in relying on the standard, one isn't positing imaginary entities that don't exist in the real world. If one's standard relies on a nonexistent God, then it is not a good standard. If one's standard relies on the claim that "Whatever my state says is morally correct" or if it says "Whatever my DNA has programmed me to believe about morality" is morally correct, then these are not good standards.
I'd say that a reliable standard is a consequentialist one. Not in the sense of, judge the act by its consequences, but to judge a desire by its consequences. For the long, extended explanation, see Alonzo Fyfe here.
9. What is the difference, from an atheistic standpoint, between love and hate? Aren't these merely emotional responses triggered by certain stimuli? Why is one better than the other?
These are emotional responses triggered by stimuli but that doesn't remove the possibility of people being morally responsible for them. These emotional responses are produced by our beliefs and desires. How someone reacts to say someone calling them a bad name reflects their character. Different people with different characters will react differently. Therefore, one can blame someone for their reactions to stimuli.
Love is better than the other because it is conducive to desire fulfillment whereas hate is generally not. Hate is by definition desire-thwarting so this makes it a desire we shouldn't promote in others, that is if we are concerned for our own well-being and that of others. So, love is better than hate for this reason.
10. How do you explain transcendent truth? i.e. Even folks that have never heard of the Bible (like tribe people in deep jungles) knowing that stealing, murder, adultery, etc. is wrong?
I think this one is fairly easy. I would take out murder since murder is immoral by definition. It's like asking, "How did you know the blue ball was blue?" Well, it's a blue ball so it must be blue, duh!
As for the rest, I would say that figuring out that the desire to steal is not conducive to desire fulfillment overall is pretty obvious. I don't think we need complex scientific theories to see this is true. The same can be said of committing adultery and the general act of being dishonest. Surely, society functions much better when people have a desire to tell people the truth and to not steal from others.
11. Isn't implicit, weak or negative atheism (ala George Smith, David Eller & Michael Martin) just another form of agnosticism? If the atheist critiques theism without justification, then isn't he/she believing in atheism with something other than rational thought? And as soon as the atheist provides any kind of rational justification for his/her critique of theism, hasn't he/she just moved into explicit, strong or positive atheism? And if so, doesn't he/she then need to worry about some burden of proof for his/her belief in a lack of belief?
One could define lack of belief in a God as a form of agnosticism. Definitions don't matter much to me. See my earlier post. I don't know what it means to "critique theism without justification" so I can't answer the second question. I think critiquing theism would be equivalent to giving evidence for positive atheism only if "atheism" is defined as the "disbelief in the God being critiqued." I don't think one can argue from "God as you define it has problems, therefore all definitions of 'god' will have problems." I don't understand the last question since positive atheism is a disbelief, not just a lack of belief.
12. If you honestly do not believe there is a God, why do you ask so many questions about a God you don't believe exists?
I'd say there's many reasons. The first is that religious people use their religious text to justify harm done to others. At this point, it is important to research whether using the given religious text is the right thing to do. Is it reliable? Are the other claims it makes true? To answer these questions, one needs to know certain things about the ancient world, God, and so on. A second reason is that so many people believe in some form of a god that atheists want to know why. A third reason is that if there is a God in the traditional sense, then it would be very important morally. To find out that a morally perfect being created you and gave you the gift of life, that would make it super-wrong to do wrong acts. Also, since we owe a being who created us something, we would owe God obedience (to a certain extent). Of course, there is a limit to how much God can ask of us much the same way there is a limit to how much anyone can ask of us when a favor is done. See my answer to #7 above. If our creator asked us to rape as much as possible, then even though we owe our creator certain things, we don't owe it to him to obey that command. So, I think God's existence would have some bearing on morality and he would be a source of morality. See my earlier post.
13. If you really don't believe God exists what does it matter to you, how He should choose to punish those who don't believe?
I think it matters because people often use their belief in this matter to justify harming others. Some people who believe that homosexuals go to hell use this fact to justify beating them up and calling them names. They justify these things by saying that if it'll help even one person change their ways, it was worth it since hell is such a bad place.
I don't think belief is a morally cupable action that one can be blamed for. So, a morally good person wouldn't punish someone just for their belief. He would only punish people insofar as their beliefs indicate the presence of bad desires. I think it is important for wrongdoers to atone for their wrongdoing. It is important to "make it up" to the person you wronged. I don't think there is any good reason why God would draw the line at death as the last chance to atone for our sins. I think good people who don't end up atoning for their sins before they die should go to a limbo-type place where they can find out the truth and see if they want to atone for their sins. If they don't want to, I think they should either be allowed to continue to exist in a place other than limbo or heaven or possibly if they no longer want to exist, then God would terminate their existence.
14. If you really believe God doesn't exist, then there is no worry of punishment for you anyway, so why get upset just because someone else believes you're going to a place they believe exists?
I don't get upset because someone has different beliefs about the afterlife than me. I may want to show their view to be false or indefensible, but I don't get upset about their view. And the reason why atheists tend to get upset is because the religious people, believing atheists will go to hell and never return, try many immoral things to get atheists to become of their religion. That is something to be upset about.
15. How about "life from no life?"
I don't really see what the trouble is in believing this. I don't think life is so fundamentally different from non-living things that perhaps non-living things would eventually bring about life. People who are alive are made up of the same elements as the things that aren't alive. Diamond is a form of carbon. I think one needs to give a good explanation of how life came about, yes but I don't think the fact that scientists don't have one means we should automatically jump to "God did it." Theists have made this mistake in the past and have been wrong, things like "God makes the planets revolve around the sun."
Most biologists agree that it's possible and I don't see any reason to think they are wrong. It's just an area where science hasn't given us a definite answer yet, but that doesn't mean there isn't one forthcoming. However, there are many plausible stories, none of which has any definite evidence over the other, but they are still plausible nonetheless.
16. How can atheists speak definitively, authoritatively, or otherwise on the metaphysical (and spiritual)which is beyond their experience?
Many theists don't have the relevant experience they would need to say other religions are false. They never studied the Kabballah, Hindu religious texts, or the Koran. They never went to other churches and prayed to their god(s) and worshipped them in the way the leaders told them to worship. So, how can they say the other religions are false?
I think reason can play a part here. If they have some argument or some type of personal experience, they may reason from that to say that other religions are false. The same can be said of atheists though they don't necessarily have a personal experience, they just have arguments. But surely, one is only better than the other because one is more certain than the other. It's not that one needs to have both to be justified in their take on religion.
For example, if someone believed in leprachauns, you would be justified in not giving their claim very much weight. If they responded with, "Well you're no expert on leprachuan-searching, how would you know they don't exist?" one can easily see the absurdity of asking the question. So, one can respond to metaphysical questions which is beyond their experience if they think the object is impossible or improbable to exist. The same goes for everyone.
Friday, March 30, 2007
Using heaven to argue for hell
Against the idea that hell is eternal, people often argue that it is unjust to punish someone for an infinite amount of time for a finite number of sins. This is because each sin is only finitely wrong and hence only deserves a finite amount of punishment. Since one can only commit a finite number of sins, there is only a finite amount of wrong they can commit. Hence, they would only deserve a finite amount of suffering, not an infinite amount. So, punishing someone in hell for an infinite amount of time is wrong.
Sometimes to counter this, Christians argue that the argument can go against sending people to heaven for eternity as well. Each person who goes to heaven only commits a finite number of good acts in their life and hence is only entitled to a finite amount of reward. Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust. Therefore, it would be unjust for God to send people to heaven for all eternity.
However, since it is not unjust for God to send people to heaven, then the argument has been reduced to absurdity so it must be unsound.
This doesn't work however, because there is a necessary disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve. If we give people good things, even give them good things that they don't deserve, it is not wrong to do so. It actually may be supererogatory in some circumstances. For example, when you give money to the poor, perhaps the poor don't "deserve" your money. However, that doesn't show that it's wrong or unjust to give to the poor. It is still a good thing to do.
However, it is wrong and unjust to punish someone more than they deserve. If I deserve n days of punishment, punishing me for n+1 days would be wrong. The same with any more amount of punishment than what I deserve. So, the argument can't be reduced to absurdity because the statement " Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust" is false. There is a disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve.
Sometimes to counter this, Christians argue that the argument can go against sending people to heaven for eternity as well. Each person who goes to heaven only commits a finite number of good acts in their life and hence is only entitled to a finite amount of reward. Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust. Therefore, it would be unjust for God to send people to heaven for all eternity.
However, since it is not unjust for God to send people to heaven, then the argument has been reduced to absurdity so it must be unsound.
This doesn't work however, because there is a necessary disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve. If we give people good things, even give them good things that they don't deserve, it is not wrong to do so. It actually may be supererogatory in some circumstances. For example, when you give money to the poor, perhaps the poor don't "deserve" your money. However, that doesn't show that it's wrong or unjust to give to the poor. It is still a good thing to do.
However, it is wrong and unjust to punish someone more than they deserve. If I deserve n days of punishment, punishing me for n+1 days would be wrong. The same with any more amount of punishment than what I deserve. So, the argument can't be reduced to absurdity because the statement " Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust" is false. There is a disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve.
Limited Omniscience is compatible with moral perfection
I have a correction to make after reading Richard Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil (specifically p. 231-232). An argument that I thought was sound is actually not a good one. As has been explained before, Swinburne believes that God doesn't know the future with absolute certainty. He may know what is probable, but he isn't absolutely sure that it will happen. Michael Martin in his book, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification brings up an objection to this. I summarize his argument on my page:
"Limited Omniscience vs. Moral Perfection
If God doesn't know the future, then he can't know whether or not his past actions were morally correct. Whether or not an action is morally correct depends on, in part, what the consequences are. However, God cannot know the consequences of his actions, therefore He can't know that He is morally perfect. God could still choose all the correct actions. However, this would have no relation to his knowledge. He would do the right thing purely on accident. Because no being can be morally perfect on accident, it follows that a being with "limited omniscience" cannot be morally perfect. Since God is supposed to be such a being, it follows that God cannot exist. [2]"
As Swinburne explains however, this objection has a false premise. What makes an action morally correct is, in part, the probable consequences of the act. The actual consequences only matter insofar as they are probable. Someone can't be blamed for what happens if they have no indication whatsoever that it will happen. Since God will know how probable all outcomes are, he can do the act that maximizes the expected value. The act that he does will be the right one.
So, since someone can't be blamed for the actual consequences of an act if there is no indication that those consequences will happen, then what makes an act right or wrong is the probable consequences. Therefore, the argument has a false premise. So, Martin's argument is unsound even though I once thought it worked. I will change it on my site and explain why the argument doesn't work.
It is important to note that this response to the argument only works if we suppose it is impossible for a being to know more than God does about the world. For example, God doesn't know the future on Swinburne's understanding. We also have to give a reason why God cannot know the future in order for this response to stick. Otherwise, one could say that a morally perfect being must know the future which would be a possible thing to know. If one shows that knowing the future is impossible if humans have libertarian free will, then the concept of moral perfection must not require a being to be morally perfect in order to fulfill it; otherwise moral perfection would be necessarily nonexistent.
So, if one defines "moral perfection" in a way that is possible for a being to fulfill it, then one must not need the requirement that the being who is morally perfect knows the future with absolute certainty. If one needs this requirement, then their definition of moral perfection is inapplicable to any possible being. This doesn't show a problem with the idea of God being morally perfect in any sense, just a problem with the sense of moral perfection that the arguer is using. If one defines a concept in a self-contradictory way, one cannot be surprised when it cannot be applied to any being at all.
And for the record, I still think the argument above it titled The Free Will Argument for the Nonexistence of God still works. However, I think it only disproves a God who can know the future. It doesn't disprove Swinburne's God who doesn't know the future with absolute certainty.
"Limited Omniscience vs. Moral Perfection
If God doesn't know the future, then he can't know whether or not his past actions were morally correct. Whether or not an action is morally correct depends on, in part, what the consequences are. However, God cannot know the consequences of his actions, therefore He can't know that He is morally perfect. God could still choose all the correct actions. However, this would have no relation to his knowledge. He would do the right thing purely on accident. Because no being can be morally perfect on accident, it follows that a being with "limited omniscience" cannot be morally perfect. Since God is supposed to be such a being, it follows that God cannot exist. [2]"
As Swinburne explains however, this objection has a false premise. What makes an action morally correct is, in part, the probable consequences of the act. The actual consequences only matter insofar as they are probable. Someone can't be blamed for what happens if they have no indication whatsoever that it will happen. Since God will know how probable all outcomes are, he can do the act that maximizes the expected value. The act that he does will be the right one.
So, since someone can't be blamed for the actual consequences of an act if there is no indication that those consequences will happen, then what makes an act right or wrong is the probable consequences. Therefore, the argument has a false premise. So, Martin's argument is unsound even though I once thought it worked. I will change it on my site and explain why the argument doesn't work.
It is important to note that this response to the argument only works if we suppose it is impossible for a being to know more than God does about the world. For example, God doesn't know the future on Swinburne's understanding. We also have to give a reason why God cannot know the future in order for this response to stick. Otherwise, one could say that a morally perfect being must know the future which would be a possible thing to know. If one shows that knowing the future is impossible if humans have libertarian free will, then the concept of moral perfection must not require a being to be morally perfect in order to fulfill it; otherwise moral perfection would be necessarily nonexistent.
So, if one defines "moral perfection" in a way that is possible for a being to fulfill it, then one must not need the requirement that the being who is morally perfect knows the future with absolute certainty. If one needs this requirement, then their definition of moral perfection is inapplicable to any possible being. This doesn't show a problem with the idea of God being morally perfect in any sense, just a problem with the sense of moral perfection that the arguer is using. If one defines a concept in a self-contradictory way, one cannot be surprised when it cannot be applied to any being at all.
And for the record, I still think the argument above it titled The Free Will Argument for the Nonexistence of God still works. However, I think it only disproves a God who can know the future. It doesn't disprove Swinburne's God who doesn't know the future with absolute certainty.
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