Using heaven to argue for hell

Against the idea that hell is eternal, people often argue that it is unjust to punish someone for an infinite amount of time for a finite number of sins. This is because each sin is only finitely wrong and hence only deserves a finite amount of punishment. Since one can only commit a finite number of sins, there is only a finite amount of wrong they can commit. Hence, they would only deserve a finite amount of suffering, not an infinite amount. So, punishing someone in hell for an infinite amount of time is wrong.

Sometimes to counter this, Christians argue that the argument can go against sending people to heaven for eternity as well. Each person who goes to heaven only commits a finite number of good acts in their life and hence is only entitled to a finite amount of reward. Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust. Therefore, it would be unjust for God to send people to heaven for all eternity.

However, since it is not unjust for God to send people to heaven, then the argument has been reduced to absurdity so it must be unsound.

This doesn't work however, because there is a necessary disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve. If we give people good things, even give them good things that they don't deserve, it is not wrong to do so. It actually may be supererogatory in some circumstances. For example, when you give money to the poor, perhaps the poor don't "deserve" your money. However, that doesn't show that it's wrong or unjust to give to the poor. It is still a good thing to do.

However, it is wrong and unjust to punish someone more than they deserve. If I deserve n days of punishment, punishing me for n+1 days would be wrong. The same with any more amount of punishment than what I deserve. So, the argument can't be reduced to absurdity because the statement " Any more reward than what they deserve would be unjust" is false. There is a disanalogy between punishing people more than they deserve and rewarding people more than they deserve.

Limited Omniscience is compatible with moral perfection

I have a correction to make after reading Richard Swinburne's Providence and the Problem of Evil (specifically p. 231-232).  An argument that I thought was sound is actually not a good one. As has been explained before, Swinburne believes that God doesn't know the future with absolute certainty. He may know what is probable, but he isn't absolutely sure that it will happen. Michael Martin in his book, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification brings up an objection to this. I summarize his argument on my page:

"Limited Omniscience vs. Moral Perfection

If God doesn't know the future, then he can't know whether or not his past actions were morally correct. Whether or not an action is morally correct depends on, in part, what the consequences are. However, God cannot know the consequences of his actions, therefore He can't know that He is morally perfect. God could still choose all the correct actions. However, this would have no relation to his knowledge. He would do the right thing purely on accident. Because no being can be morally perfect on accident, it follows that a being with "limited omniscience" cannot be morally perfect. Since God is supposed to be such a being, it follows that God cannot exist. [2]"

As Swinburne explains however, this objection has a false premise. What makes an action morally correct is, in part, the probable consequences of the act. The actual consequences only matter insofar as they are probable. Someone can't be blamed for what happens if they have no indication whatsoever that it will happen. Since God will know how probable all outcomes are, he can do the act that maximizes the expected value. The act that he does will be the right one.

So, since someone can't be blamed for the actual consequences of an act if there is no indication that those consequences will happen, then what makes an act right or wrong is the probable consequences. Therefore, the argument has a false premise. So, Martin's argument is unsound even though I once thought it worked. I will change it on my site and explain why the argument doesn't work.

It is important to note that this response to the argument only works if we suppose it is impossible for a being to know more than God does about the world. For example, God doesn't know the future on Swinburne's understanding. We also have to give a reason why God cannot know the future in order for this response to stick. Otherwise, one could say that a morally perfect being must know the future which would be a possible thing to know. If one shows that knowing the future is impossible if humans have libertarian free will, then the concept of moral perfection must not require a being to be morally perfect in order to fulfill it; otherwise moral perfection would be necessarily nonexistent.

So, if one defines "moral perfection" in a way that is possible for a being to fulfill it, then one must not need the requirement that the being who is morally perfect knows the future with absolute certainty. If one needs this requirement, then their definition of moral perfection is inapplicable to any possible being. This doesn't show a problem with the idea of God being morally perfect in any sense, just a problem with the sense of moral perfection that the arguer is using. If one defines a concept in a self-contradictory way, one cannot be surprised when it cannot be applied to any being at all.

And for the record, I still think the argument above it titled The Free Will Argument for the Nonexistence of God still works. However, I think it only disproves a God who can know the future. It doesn't disprove Swinburne's God who doesn't know the future with absolute certainty.