Why does God Exist?

Introduction

The Cosmological argument for God's existence looks at the universe and asks what the cause of it is. Proponents of the argument also maintain that God's existence need not have a cause. Atheists have long replied that theists can't have it both ways. If theists are willing to posit God without any explanation, why are atheists not so obliged to posit the universe without any explanation?

Historically, theists have attempted to circumvent explaining the existence of God (but still positing a cause for the universe) in three ways: (1) God has existed for eternity, (2) God is logically necessary, or (3) God contains the reason for his own existence.

I attempt to show that all three ways fail to satisfactorily answer the question. I will give a fourth response that does salvage the Cosmological argument and admits that (1) God's existence is a brute fact but yet (2) the universe should be explained using God's existence.

Analysis

Key Assumption

In the following analysis, I will use the following proposition to establish my criticism of the three different responses.

P: One can imagine God as not existing. That being either that there is no God, there is nothing at all, or there is a very powerful being who could have varying degrees of knowledge and goodness.

Surely, P is true. We could imagine there being a God who is pretty good, but not morally perfect. We could imagine there being a very powerful evil being instead of an all-good God. We could even imagine there being nothing. This shows that God's existence need not occur.

Response 1: God's existence had no beginning.

When attempting to explain why we need not explain God's existence but we do need to explain the universe's existence, some theists have mentioned that God has existed for eternity. The universe, on the other hand, hasn't always existed so this begs for an explanation whereas God's existence does not.

This response relies on the following assumption (denoted A1):

A1. Something has a cause for its existence if and only if it had a beginning.

Perhaps it can be established that if something had a beginning, then it has a cause. However, this doesn't imply that if something doesn't have a beginning, it cannot have a cause.

Let's bring up proposition P from before. Surely, even if God has existed for all eternity, he may have had different properties. God could have existed for all eternity and been less than morally perfect. God need not have all knowledge to have existed for all eternity and it is the case that he could have not existed at all, for all eternity. Therefore, mentioning that God had no beginning fails to explain why God has the properties he has or why he exists in the first place.

To put it a different way, this argument supposes that the existence of God at a given time can be fully explained by looking at a time before when he existed. However, this does not explain why God exists in the first place with the properties he has.

So, the first response fails to establish that we need to explain the existence of the universe but yet God's existence can go unexplained.

Response 2: God is logically necessary

Another way to circumvent the issue is to argue that God's existence is logically necessary via the Ontological argument. Basically, this argument attempts to show that God's non-existence is logically impossible. Much like the statement that 2+2=4. This statement has to be true, regardless of anything else. The argument attempts to establish God's existence being akin to the existence of mathematical theorems or logical rules.

To throw some doubt onto any form of the ontological argument, one must note that most philosophers do not accept it as sound. Also, we can recall proposition P. If P is true, then God's existence need not hold which implies that God's existence is not logically necessary. It is curious that one is able to imagine God as not existing or to exist in a different way if the ontological argument is supposed to be successful.

So, the statement that God is logically necessary is not a good response since it relies on a rejection of proposition P and relies on the Ontological argument. Since P is intuitively true and the Ontological argument is widely criticized, the retreat that God is logically necessary is not a successful one.

Response 3: The Principle of Sufficient Reason

Leibniz, in positing his version of the Cosmological argument, relied on the principle of sufficient reason. The principle states:

For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation why x exists.

This can be read as denying the existence of any brute facts. He argues that God contains his own reason for existing while the universe does not. Therefore, according to the principle of sufficient reason, the universe still needs a reason for its existence but God does not.

The problem here is by saying that God contains the reason for his own existence. Unless one is also relying on God being logically necessary (see response 2) the argument will fail. Of course, one can use statement P cited in the beginning to show that God could have possibly not existed so by the principle, God must need a reason to exist.

Response 4: Swinburne Salvages the Argument

With these 3 responses failing, many have concluded the Cosmological argument cannot be salvaged. However, Richard Swinburne has come up with a way to do so. In his book The Existence of God, Swinburne argues that one should move beyond a given explanation only if doing so results in a gain in explanatory power and simplicity.

One example is the law of gravity. One can note that objects fall to the ground when they are released. Why does this happen? One can posit the law of gravity as an explanation. Why is this a good explanation and why is it warranted to move beyond accepting objects falling to the ground as a brute fact?

Using Swinburne's point, in doing so, one gains simplicity and explanatory power. Surely, with the law of gravity, one can explain why objects will fall when released. Also, one gains simplicity because positing the simple law of gravity explains all the instances of objects falling to the earth. One need not accept all these separate instances as brute facts (a very complex hypothesis) but can instead posit one simple law to explain all the observations.

As a sidenote, it is interesting to note two objections often heard against positing God as an explanation for the universe are rebutted.

One being,

"If you say God created the universe, then what created him? Without saying what created God, you can't explain the universe by positing him."

This is obviously false since one can explain objects falling to the ground with the law of gravity without having to explain why the law of gravity exists.

The next being,

"When you posit a God, you have complicated the explanation. When choosing between only the universe existing and the universe and God existing, the simpler explanation is just the universe. So, Occam's Razor should be used to cut God out of the picture."

However, this objection could also be brought against the gravity explanation.

One could say, "In positing gravity, you need to posit all the instances of objects falling to the earth and the additional statement that the law of gravity makes them do so. I'll use Occam's razor and stick to the simpler picture that these objects just fall to the earth with no law to govern them."

However, since the law of gravity is being used to explain objects falling to the earth, one need not posit both in an explanation. Since the law of gravity is simpler than supposing all the separate instances when objects have fallen to the ground, gravity can be used to explain the instances in question.

Likewise, since God is being posited to explain the universe, one need not posit both entities, just God. If God is simpler than the universe, then positing God is the simpler hypothesis.

So, Swinburne's principle states that if you gain simplicity and explanatory power by positing a new entity, then that increases the probability the entity exists. However, why think that God is simpler than the universe? Also, how can God be used to explain the universe's existence? What reasons does God have for that?

Swinburne argues that positing God is positing an entity with only one property. That being omnipotence. He uses this property to argue that God must also be omniscient, perfectly free, and morally perfect. Since God is a being with one property, he is clearly simpler than the universe we observe.

Also, God has good reasons to create a universe like the one we observe. Clearly, creating humans is a good thing. It is good for beings to exist who have the choice between good and evil and can affect the world around them, for better or worse. (See Chapter 6 of The Existence of God.)

Clearly, God has the ability to create a complex universe since he is omnipotent. Therefore, positing the existence of God gives us reason to expect a universe with humans.

It has been established that God is a simpler hypothesis than the complex universe and can be used to explain the existence of that universe. Therefore, the observation of a complex universe increases the probability of the existence of God.

But why does God exist? Why can we stop at God and not stop at the universe? Well, using the same principle, if we posited a cause for God, we would not gain simplicity since God is already an exceedingly simple being. So, it is not unlikely God would exist uncaused. However, the universe, given its complexity, is very unlikely to exist uncaused.

Swinburne concludes chapter 7 on the Cosmological argument in this way:

There is quite a chance that, if there is a God, he will make something of the finitude and complexity of a universe. It is very unlikely that a universe would exist uncaused, but rather more likely that God would exist uncaused. (p. 152)

Using Swinburne's principle, we have salvaged the Cosmological argument.

Conclusion

Critics of the Cosmological argument have long objected that you can't ask for a cause of the universe while also ignoring that God is being posited without an explanation. Three responses to this charge have traditionally been given but they all fail. They are (1) God has a beginning but the universe does not, (2) God is logically necessary but the universe is not, and (3) God has sufficient reason to exist but the universe does not.

A more sophisticated response from Swinburne states that God is simpler than the universe and one gains explanatory power by positing God, so the probability God exists is increased. This response allows God to exist uncaused rather than allowing the universe to exist uncaused. This is because of the simplicity of God compared to the complexity of the universe. Since God is far simpler, it is far more likely he would exist uncaused rather than the universe.


(For Swinburne's discussion of these points, see Chapters 5-7 of The Existence of God.)

Attacking Christianity

If taking down the ten commandments from a courthouse is attacking Christianity, then isn't putting them up attacking non-Christians?

If not mandating daily school prayer is an attack on Christianity, then isn't mandating one an attack on nonbelievers?

If attempting to remove the phrase "under God" from our pledge and "In God we Trust" from our national motto is an attack on Christianity, then doesn't keeping those phrases constitute an attack on other religions (polytheists) and nonbelievers?

If attempting to remove the process of swearing on the Bible in court is an attack on Christianity, then isn't keeping that process an attack on non-Christians?

Or perhaps stopping these acts does not constitute an attack on any religion but recognizes the fact that a particular religious belief is not required to be an American. That many non-Christians have made great sacrifices to our country (like say, fighting for us in war) and to attempt to create a division and call the religious American and the non-religious unpatriotic would be woefully unjust.

McCain vs. Obama on Healthcare

Here is a very informative article written by the CATO Institute comparing the two presidential candidates' healthcare proposals.

Legislating Morality

Many people have used the phrase in political debate that one should not legislate morality. However, this claim is false and not coherent. We will see why below.

"One should not legislate morality"

It is important to see what those who are against 'legislating morality' are claiming to be against. People who are against 'legislating morality' often point to laws that go too far and do not respect people's privacy. A law against homosexuality would be 'legislating morality' since sexual orientation, as long as it's not harming others, should be a private matter. The government should not be ignoring people's right to privacy. The argument can also be extended to many other examples.

However, one must note the presence of the clause "as long as it's not harming others." What is the justification for this clause? Also, how does one say "The government should not be ignoring people's right to privacy?"

The justification of any law must come from morality. If one shows that, without a given law, many people would be hurt only proves it is a just law if it is morally required that we care about other people's suffering. The same can be said about any other justification of a law. Adding the phrase "as long as no harm is done to others" presumes that morality demands that we care about harming others.

So, when one is talking about what the law ought to say, one has no other choice but to resort to morality. Realizing this makes the statement "The law ought not legislate morality" very puzzling since the phrase "ought" is in there. If that is a 'moral' ought then one is equivalently saying, "Morality demands that we do not legislate morality."

Clearly, something has gone wrong here. If we can't legislate morality, then what morality demands would be irrelevant. We wouldn't be able to use morality to show morality can't be legislated.

In order to legislate morality, one need not argue that since an act is wrong, it must be legislated against. There are many competing issues when determining what acts to legislate against. An act would have to be immoral but we also have to consider if, in policing the act, we are violating people's rights. One of these rights is a right to privacy. Surely, this right can be overridden if the act is terrible enough. These are things that must be weighed. Surely, no one is arguing that one should make all immoral acts illegal.

Morality provides a framework to weigh competing considerations. Without morality, you cannot weigh these considerations at all to determine what acts one should legislate against.

Conclusion

Clearly, one has to legislate morality. The phrase "One ought not legislate morality" is a confused one and is surely false. For another person expressing the same viewpoint, see Alonzo's post here.

Ch. 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?

Chapter 1

We have three debaters to debate this chapter. William Rowe will argue that evil is evidence against belief in God. His opponents are Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann.

William Rowe's Case
First, William Rowe makes his case that evil is evidence against God's existence. He makes it very clear at the beginning what is being argued. He isn't attempting to show that God doesn't exist or that overall, the evidence is against him. He is attempting to show that, all other grounds for belief in God aside, the consideration of the amount and intensity of suffering that exists makes God's existence less likely.

His argument structure is the following:
1. There exists horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit evil without a justifying reason for doing so.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.

He does not claim to be able to establish premise (1) with certainty. His point is given the instances of horrendous evil that we see every day, it is plausible that (1) is true. He gives two instances of seemingly pointless suffering which are:

1. A fawn is horribly burned in a forest fire caused by lightning. It lies on the forest floor suffering terribly for five days before death relieves it of its suffering.

2. A five year old girl is brutally beaten, raped, and strangled in Flint, Michigan, on New Year's Day.

He states that examples such as these are plentiful and it is pretty difficult to believe that God had a good reason for allowing them to occur. It seems that whatever good we can come up with, it doesn't seem to justify God allowing the event to occur. These are examples of seemingly pointless suffering which make premise (1) seem plausible.

First Objection: Argument from Ignorance

Rowe responds to the objection that his argument from evil is an argument from ignorance. The argument goes: We are not omniscient like God is so we shouldn't expect to understand all the reasons he allows bad things to happen. It is fallacious to argue that we don't see a reason why certain bad events occur to argue that there is no such good reason. After all, a good parent may have to make his kids suffer for their good even if they can't understand why. A little kid is made to go to the dentist, for example.

Rowe responds that it may be plausible to think a finite being has a good reason for these evils to occur, it isn't plausible to think an infinite being does. Also, if God were a good parent, why doesn't he comfort us while we're going through this necessary evil? Why does he stay silent? It would be like a parent sending their kid to the dentist and not comforting them and telling them that it's for their own good. God, if he exists, has been silent on many occasions where horrendous suffering has occurred. Rowe wonders why.

He meets the argument head on on page 9 by saying that we have a reasonable judgment of the goods involved in many of these seemingly pointless instances of suffering. Therefore, we can trust our intuition and say that it is plausible they are pointless.

Second Objection: Theodicies

Rowe then considers that someone could bring up a reason why God allows such evils and if that reason worked, then that would refute his argument. However, he contends such theodicies fail. He briefly mentions and objects to the free will theodicy.

Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann's Response

Snyder and Bergmann aren't interested in bringing up any theodicies to defeat Rowe's argument. Instead, they take the first objection, that Rowe's argument is an argument from ignorance. That we don't have good reason to say, one way or the other, whether an omnipotent, omniscient being would have justifying reasons to allow the given instances of suffering.

Nosseum Arguments

Snyder and Bergmann bring up the example of extraterrestrials. They imagine someone who sees no evidence for aliens to argue that they probably don't exist. To guarantee this conclusion however, the following proposition is needed:

P1. More likely than not, if aliens existed, we would find evidence for them.

However, P1 doesn't seem true. We can think of many reasons why we wouldn't see any evidence for aliens if they existed. Perhaps they live too far away or are not intelligent enough to make contact or have no desire to do so. So, it is not reasonable to accept P1.

They argue there is a similar proposition in need of proving in Rowe's argument, that being:

P1'. More likely than not, if a justifying reason for God to allow these horrendous evils existed, we would see them.

They argue that we just don't have enough knowledge to know if this statement is true. Therefore, the burden is on Rowe to show that it is.

Rowe's Response

Rowe responds to nosseum argument that he is making something more like a no-conceivum argument. Not only is it the case that we don't see goods coming from the horrendous evils, we can't imagine why a God would allow such things. This does not parallel the case of extraterrestrials because we can imagine situations where they wouldn't visit us but still exist. However, we can't imagine justifying reasons God may have.

He also criticizes them by asking how much evil would it take for it to be enough against God's existence? Even if all of our lives were characterized by constant suffering, Bergmann and Snyder seem like they would still argue that we are not in a good enough position to say whether God would allow it.

Bergmann and Snyder's Response

They respond that Rowe still hasn't given a good reason to think that if God had justifying reasons for the evils we see, that we would see them. He is arguing that we can't conceive of a reason for God to allow them which implies there probably isn't one. This takes a nosseum proposition like P1' given above and none has been defended.

Evaluation

Overall, I would say that Rowe's argument is not an argument from ignorance. I think, without a theodicy of any sort, when faced with the large amounts of evil that occur, they have to count against God's existence. I think there is a good theodicy given by Richard Swinburne in his book Providence and the Problem of Evil. However, the number of seemingly pointless instances of suffering do cry out for an explanation. It seems that in general, we are in a good position to tell whether a future event is likely to result in unnecessary suffering. We do it all the time.

Bergmann and Snyder do make an initially convincing case though. However, their case seems to go against the statement that if something seems true, that gives evidence towards it being true. They want to argue in a case similar to Stephen Wykstra. He argues that the following principle is true with regard to believing something based on appearances.

"On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would be different than it is in some way discernible to her."--(quoted from Providence and Problem of evil, p. 25)

For example, we can only say of an object that it appears to be red if we have reason to believe that if it wasn't red, it would appear in a different way and we would be able to detect it as so. However, this claim is too bold and leads to an infinite regress.

Take any ordinary claim like my computer appears to be in front of me. Using Wykstra's argument, we would only be able to claim this if I could say that if my computer weren't in front of me, then it wouldn't appear to be there. This appears fine and true, but using Wykstra's principle, this is not enough. We need reason to think that if this statement were false, we would know it. We may be able to come up with yet another reason but in the end, we would be stuck in an infinite regress trying to justify each appearance. So, it seems the general principle underlying Wykstra's and Bergmann's and Snyder's response is false. (I owe this point to Richard Swinburne which is made in his book Providence and Problem of Evil, p. 25-27)

So, in the end, I believe Rowe has made a better case, that theists have to put up a theodicy to answer his argument from evil. His argument is not an argument from ignorance. In response, someone can't rely on the general statement that we can only claim that it appears that p if we have good reason to think if p were false, we would detect it. A theist must come up with a theodicy if he is to answer Rowe's argument from evil. I do think such a theodicy exists (Swinburne's) but without one, Rowe's argument succeeds.

Go here for a good paper on nosseum arguments.

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion

Hello there,

I recently checked out Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. It has many different contributors. I'd like to start a series where I review a debate in here every week. There are 12 total. When I do them, I will create links on this page so they can all be found in one spot.

Chapter 1: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?

Connecticut Valley Atheists: Imagine No Religion

Hello,

The Connecticut Valley Atheists have posted a sign that has a picture of the twin towers standing with the statement: Imagine No Religion. This is a bigoted sign and should be treated with discontempt. It is just as bigoted to look at all the wrong done by Joseph Stalin and post a picture of it and say: Imagine No Religion. Joseph Stalin was an atheist but clearly not all atheists are bad like Joseph Stalin. The people who ran airplanes into the World Trade Center were religious but clearly not all religious people are prone to these acts of violence.

A religion caused 9/11. That is very different from saying all religions cause extreme acts of violence. Sure, the world would be a better place if there weren't any Islamic fanatics running airplanes into buildings. That doesn't mean that the world would be better if there were no religion at all. That statement takes a lot more evidence. (Note, I am not saying anything about Muslims in general, just the fanatical ones who caused 9/11.)

A post I made earlier echoes similar comments and gives a more thorough treatment of the atheists who wish to blame religion for the wrongdoing of the religious. It also criticizes theists who wish to blame atheism for the wrongdoing of atheists.

Here is a post by Alonzo Fyfe who is an atheist against the sign posted by the Connecticut Valley Atheists.

Please remember it is not religion or atheism that causes these things, it is people's blindness to the truth. It is their exceedingly strong desire to believe a certain act is good that makes them ignore all the evidence to the contrary.

From a comment made by Alonzo on his blog, he writes:

"Think of a sign that says, "Imagine: No Arabs." We can defend such a sign the same way people are trying to defend the "Imagine: No Religion"sign. Yes, it is possible that some non-Arab might have some day attacked the towers. However, if we had a world without arabs, chances are, the towers would still be standing.

Does this justify the sentiment, "Imagine: No Arabs?"

No . . . because it blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.

Similarly, "Imagine: No Religion" blames a whole group of people who did nothing wrong.

Both versions are morally repulsive and for the same reasons."

See this post for more defense by Alonzo.